



Ministry  
of Defence

# Reserve Forces Review 2030

Unlocking the reserves' potential to  
strengthen a resilient and global Britain



May 2021



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# Foreword

## Brigadier The Rt Hon The Lord Lancaster TD VR

When the Chief of the Defence Staff asked me to chair an independent review into the reserve forces, I leapt at the opportunity. For over 32 years, the Army Reserve has been an integral part of my life and perhaps the one constant of my adult years. Like many fellow reservists, my service has been part of a fairly consistent juggling act between the competing demands of a hectic professional career, private life and soldiering. In writing this foreword I recognise that so much has changed.

The reserves have evolved from almost entirely contingent forces – that trained at weekends and annual camps, recruited locally, and were encapsulated by names such as ‘Territorial Army’ and ‘Royal Auxiliary Air Force’ – to the reserve forces we have today across all three services, delivering daily support and skills as part of a semi-integrated force.

Since Haldane’s creation of the Territorial Force in 1908, which subsumed militia and volunteers, the reserves have always embraced change. It is perhaps because reservists are both drawn from, and are part of, society, that one of their key strengths over many years is their enduring capacity to adapt to the needs of the day. The relationship between the military and society, in which the reserve forces play a crucial role, is complex and changing, and the challenges the country has faced during COVID-19 have underlined how important that relationship is.

The most recent reform was the Future Reserves 2020 review, which focused on both the growth and investment in the single service reserves. Until that point the reserve forces were viewed by some as being in decline, having been used almost solely as a source of individuals to bolster a regular force exhausted after years of campaigning. Building on the undoubted success of the implementation of that review over the last 10 years, the terms of reference for this review are rather different.



Rather than looking ‘down and in’ at the use of reserves by the single services, we have been tasked with looking ‘up and out’.

At its heart, this Reserve Forces Review 2030 (RF30) is about people and skills, and how Defence, industry, government and wider society can share them. This means looking at how reserve forces can provide capability across government departments, deliver networks into industry and academia, reinforce national resilience and homeland security, and renew and strengthen the link between the military and society in general.

The national experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated in no uncertain terms how the nation needs to pull together in time of crisis and how government, Parliament, state institutions, industry and the general public rely on each other. In harnessing this latent appetite to volunteer, our review has looked at how the UK’s reserve forces can provide a nucleus for this activity.

It became quickly apparent that this cannot be just another review that focused on reserves – if it was, then it would fail in its intent. Rather, it needed to be a review on the provision of defence capability in the round. It is apt, therefore, that our work has been able to inform the Integrated Review into Defence and Security, and we have drawn in large part on the Integrated Operating Concept, published in draft during the early stages of our own review.



We have worked alongside the Defence People Strategy team to ensure coherence with their work. Many of our recommendations go far beyond those that may have been expected and we have consulted far and wide across government, industry, academia and of course the reserves themselves, to ensure that we have understood this wider landscape.

At the very core of this review is the reservist and a recognition of the need to ensure that the offer of service in the reserve forces remains not only attractive to the individual reservist but valued by their families and employers, too.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lawrence".

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## Executive summary

The Reserves Forces Review 2030 describes a vision for the future. It is designed to inform programmes that are likely to influence the development of the reserves and to initiate new projects where there are gaps. To achieve these objectives, it has liaised closely with the custodians of the Defence People Strategy and single services transformation programmes. The vision it describes is of empowered reserve forces that are further integrated with their regular counterparts and the wider defence enterprise, which at the same time provide greater utility and assurance across a broader range of military capabilities with access to civilian skills.

The starting point for developing the vision was to understand how the reserves fit into the Integrated Operating Concept 2025, the new joint-force approach to meeting future defence and security challenges. Its emphasis on information-age capabilities, deeper resilience, persistent overseas engagement and increased integration has catalysed the need to think differently about the roles of the reserve forces. With the balance of the regular forces' activity shifting to operate against constant security threats, the reserves will increasingly be required to contribute more of Defence's warfighting capabilities. This will mean the traditional role of the reserves will need to be enhanced if they are to deliver credible contingent capability with the required levels of assurance. The increase in 'grey-zone' threats, like cyber-attacks and terrorist incidents, coupled with rises in natural disasters, will demand the reserves also play a more significant role in the strategic resilience of the nation. The challenges the armed forces face in generating and maintaining the diversity, skills and networks needed to deliver modern capabilities will dictate an increasing use of reservists as an alternative source of talent to regulars.

To realise this vision, the review recommends a reserve framework consisting of three elements: Reinforcement, Operational and Strategic Reserves.

- Reservists whose principal role is to support routine defence activity will be managed within the Reinforcement Reserve. Not only will this improve the sharing of existing reservists' talent across Defence, but also provide the mechanisms to draw new individuals into the armed forces to access their skills, expertise and networks.
- The Operational Reserve will comprise groups of reservists who are regularly trained and exercised for contingency tasks yet still able to perform routine duties. The Operational Reserve will require resilient force structures and access to synthetic training solutions to ensure that they can deliver their outputs at appropriate readiness.
- The Strategic Reserve will add further depth to the contingent capability. Built around the ex-regular reserve forces, it will be able to generate previously unassigned surge capacity and wider access to expertise in time of crisis or national emergency. The Strategic Reserve will have a minimal routine commitment but elements of it would be periodically exercised to ensure that it can act as a credible capability and deterrent to malign actors.

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The reserves will have to be enabled to deliver their new roles. This will be done in several ways.

- First, by redefining their relationship with employers and wider society. Here the review explores ideas to use the abilities of reservists to straddle the military and civilian landscapes to make a broader contribution to defence, enhance the government's Global Britain initiative and strengthen national resilience. This will require even closer partnerships with employers and improvements in the ways we incentivise them to share their workforces.
- Second, to improve the offer to our reservists and make it easier for them to fulfil their commitments, the review recommends the establishment of a spectrum of service that allows reservists to move as freely as possible across the reserves framework, varying their levels of commitment and exploiting lateral methods of entry where appropriate. These changes, among other benefits, will help to improve diversity and inclusion within the armed forces. The review also recommends a series of initiatives designed to incentivise reservists' commitment, for example by offering education and training bursaries and apprenticeships.
- Finally, it argues that there is a need to tailor the support reservists receive. It recommends the establishment of a Reserves Support Organisation that:
  - facilitates the unique characteristics of reservists
  - provides visibility of their skills and networks, and the means to employ them at the point of need
  - assures their ability to mobilise

It also recommends:

- that Defence's digital and data services are adapted so they can better incorporate reservists into the whole force
- the tighter tying together of reserve and regular training
- the exploitation of the reserve estate

At the heart of the review's vision is a commitment to even greater integration of the reserves with the regulars and the wider defence enterprise. Transformation of the reserves cannot be achieved without transforming Defence itself. To enable this integration, it recommends that the Ministry of Defence (MOD):

- considers changes to legislation to ease transfers between commitment types
- moves away from workforce headcount targets that constrain planners' freedom to flex requirements between workforces
- adopts a budgetary strategy that incentivises the use of reservists

This would enable greater use of the reserves and accelerate Defence's aspirations towards a blended workforce model. All of this would have to be done in close co-ordination with the ambitious reserve programmes that are being developed within the single services and in line with the Defence People transformation programme.



Underpinning all elements of the review has been the need to develop a proposition that continues to attract and retain reservists. To this end, we believe this review offers the future reservist:

- increased motivation by being able to play a larger part of the armed forces' warfighting capabilities
- improved opportunities to contribute and to mobilise at home and overseas
- greater choice and control over how they offer their service
- enhanced training, digital and support services tailored to their needs
- better physical and virtual infrastructure
- more opportunities to use their civilian skills in a military environment
- more incentives to encourage increased routine commitment

Figure 0.1 illustrates the wide range of factors influencing this review and lists key deductions underpinning the RF30 vision. The review team are confident that this vision will help inspire the next generation of reservists to serve their nation with pride.



Drivers for change	What the future operating environment will demand	What the reserves offer Defence	Impediments to change
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pace of technological change</li> <li>• 'Grey-zone' activity</li> <li>• Enduring threat of major war</li> <li>• Resilience deficit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Closer integration across all five domains</li> <li>• Access to a wider set of skills</li> <li>• Detection of a broader spectrum of threats</li> <li>• Improved homeland resilience</li> <li>• Persistent overseas engagement with allies and partners</li> <li>• Closer public and private sector partnerships</li> <li>• Constant innovation</li> <li>• A broader approach to deterrence</li> <li>• A modernised workforce</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to skills, expertise and networks</li> <li>• Persistence and continuity</li> <li>• Holding capability at lower readiness</li> <li>• Surge capacity in a crisis</li> <li>• Ability to fill gaps in the regular workforce structure</li> <li>• Links to wider public sector, industry, academia and wider society</li> <li>• Increased diversity</li> <li>• Lower workforce costs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Societal contract</li> <li>• Lack of whole-force culture</li> <li>• Headcount targets</li> <li>• MOD financial accounting</li> <li>• Roles and purpose</li> <li>• Lack of critical mass</li> <li>• The existing offer</li> <li>• Complex terms and conditions of service</li> <li>• Inflexible workforce planning</li> <li>• Inability to understand and harness skills</li> <li>• Rigid medical standards</li> <li>• Poor digital services, training and infrastructure</li> </ul>

## Reserve Forces Review 2030 deductions

**A – Redefine the reserves' relationship with society**

**B – Expand the role of the reserves**

**C – Unlock the potential of reservists**

**D – Transform support to the reserves**

**Figure 0.1** – Reserve Forces Review 2030 deductions

## Reserve Forces Review 2030 recommendations

A – Redefine the reserves’ relationship with society	
A1	Increase the reserves’ contribution to UK resilience. Formalise the use of reserves within structured civil military co-operation. Increase the reserves’ role in improving the UK government’s ability to anticipate and respond to crises. Consider strengthening critical national infrastructure and the strategic base through greater use of the reserves.
A2	Increase Defence’s contribution to Global Britain through the use of reserves. Leverage reservists’ skills and networks on a persistent but episodic basis to strengthen overseas networks, develop relationships and use soft power to advance the UK’s interests.
A3	Broaden and deepen Defence’s partnerships with the private sector through the reserves. Increase senior private sector engagement, expand use of sponsored reserves and improve employer incentives. Expand the Enterprise Approach to include the sharing of reservists between the private sector and Defence.
B – Expand the role of the reserves	
B1	Undertake a review to identify how the reserve forces might do more to support contingent capabilities currently held exclusively in the regular force (with appropriate enhancements in training and unit structures).
B2	Reconfigure the reserves into a framework consisting of three elements (Reinforcement, Operational, Strategic) with a mechanism that allows seamless movement between each.
B2.1	Create a Reinforcement Reserve – an auxiliary capability that delivers or supports ongoing defence activities. It provides opportunities for existing reservists to use their military or civilian expertise; and for Defence to attract new reservists to access their civilian skills and networks; without them having to be members of reserve organisations dedicated to a contingent response. Reinforcement reservists would be managed within dedicated workforce pools or units.
B2.2	Create an Operational Reserve – a routinely trained and assured reserve capability to respond to defence tasks at times of crisis. It consists of units and some individual reservists held at readiness. It can also be used to deliver ongoing defence tasks as long as these do not impinge on its ability to respond to a crisis. Assured output would be delivered through resilient units (where necessary larger, and with a reserve/regular balance calibrated according to role).
B2.3	Create a Strategic Reserve – a latent surge capacity. It consists of reservists who are not normally available for routine duty but can deliver, across a spectrum of lower readiness, a contingent capability that can be called out either as reservists or used as non-uniformed unpaid volunteers. While largely dormant, the Strategic Reserve is a key component of the deterrent and parts of it would require to be periodically exercised for UK resilience and homeland defence.
B.3	Consider legislative change to support the closer integration of reserve and regular service. This might require the merger of the Armed Forces Act and Reserve Forces Act.
B.4	The MOD considers measures to better incentivise the Front Line Commands’ use of reserves, including adopting a budgetary strategy that makes it easier for workforce planners to dynamically flex funding between workforce types and enables more reservists to be mobilised each year.
B.5	Move away from regular and reserve headcount targets, to maximise workforce flexibility across the whole force.



## C – Unlock the potential of reservists

C1	Simplify commitment types across the whole force into fewer categories. Indicative examples may be: permanent, fixed-term, commercial, spare-time, volunteer and retained. Redesign the lexicon so it is easily understood by regulars, reservists, employers and civilians.
C2	In conjunction with the People Strategy, create a simplified spectrum of service, a flexible and harmonised terms and conditions of service (TACOS) and a variable career model that allows seamless movement within and outside of Defence.
C3	Develop an agile workforce management function to find, recruit and bring skills, expertise and networks to the point of need.
C4	Further develop reserves' recruiting to integrate with regular recruiting (where appropriate) and to improve access to the talent and diversity required to match the evolving characteristics of conflict.

## D – Transform support to the reserves

D1	<p>Explore the need for a Reserves Support Organisation to support the unique requirements of reservists. The MOD should consider how and if these functions could be delivered within newly structured Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations.*</p> <p>* Functions strictly limited to areas not currently undertaken within the services. Must promote regular/ reserve integration.</p>
D2	Exploit digitisation, technology and networks to improve recruiting, enrich the offer and connect the reserves with the whole force.
D3	Design training and education so that it can be tailored to the role, availability and diverse needs of the reservist, providing greater choice and flexibility.
D4	Consider configuring the reserves estate to create local hubs for defence outputs, including resilience support, contemporary training provision, mobilisation and civil engagement. Collaborate more with public and private sectors, sharing use and deriving income where feasible.
D5	Develop data analytics to measure reserves' readiness in detail, driving whole-force confidence in an assured resource. Configure incentives to promote personal readiness and competence for role.
D6	Refine mobilisation policy and procedures to maximise reservist opportunities for active tasks and be better prepared to mobilise for contingent tasks. Specifically review processes to improve reservists' medical and dental readiness for tasks.

# Chapter 1

## Context and the imperative for change







# Chapter 1 – Context and the imperative for change

## Key observations

The UK's reserve forces are much improved since the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that initiated the Future Reserve 2020 programme. Numbers have increased, the reserve estate is in better condition and reserves in all their different forms play an increased role in defence under the whole-force approach.

The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 sets out the operating concept for the future joint force and provides the guiding principles for RF30.

The changing demographics and expectations of the future workforce will shape a new working environment. The Defence People Strategy sets out how Defence intends to transform to meet this new environment and it is fundamental to RF30's thinking.

There is much to learn from our allies. In particular, the way the US integrate their reserves into the whole force, the moral and legal 'duty to contribute' of Scandinavian models, and the continuum of service developed in Australia.

## 1.1 Introduction

The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) transformation programme revitalised the reserve forces. However, to meet the challenges of the next decade and beyond, the reserves will need to continue to adapt so that they can increase their utility to the armed forces and wider government. This chapter outlines the achievements of FR20, examines some of the ways our allies' reserve forces operate and identifies the reasons for the reserves to undergo further change.

## 1.2 The reserve forces

The reserve forces exist in a number of forms:

- **Volunteer reserve forces.** The volunteer reserve forces are the Maritime Reserve, the Army Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. They consist of reservists who have volunteered to train on a regular basis, often in their spare time. Direct entry into the volunteer reserves is open to civilians who volunteer to undergo reserve initial training, and ex-regulars can also apply.
- **Ex-regular reserve forces.** The ex-regular reserve forces consist of the Royal Fleet Reserve, the Regular Army Reserve and the Royal Air Force Reserve. They are made up of ex-regulars split into call-out and recall reserves. The call-out reserves are those ex-regulars who remain liable for call-out for the period specified in their original commitment to serve. The recall reserve are those ex-regulars who have completed their residual commitment but can be recalled in a national emergency.
- **Sponsored reserves.** Sponsored reserves are reservists who offer their service through a third-party contract, for example the reservists who service the Army's heavy equipment transporters (HET) contract. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary is also classed as a sponsored reserve despite its reservists being employed as civil servants rather than as private-sector contractors.
- **Part- and full-time reservists.** Over 5,000 reservists are currently serving in full-time posts throughout the armed forces on various tiers of Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS). Almost 500 reservists are serving part-time on additional duties contracts. Personnel in both these categories are a mix of volunteer reserves and ex-regular reserves.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics as at 1 April 2020, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2020#history>.

All reservists operate under the legal provisions described in the Reserve Forces Act (1996) (RFA 96) rather than those that govern the regular forces in the Armed Forces Act. RFA 96 updated the primary legislation governing UK's reserve forces and forms the basis for tri-service and single-service policy. The last review of the reserve forces was initiated in 2010.

### 1.3 Future Reserves 2020

The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 concluded that the Territorial Army had performed well in Afghanistan but needed to be restructured to make better use of reservists' "skills, experience and capabilities".<sup>2</sup> The SDSR stated that future reserves should provide:

- additional capacity when regular forces were deployed at maximum effort
- specialists who it would not be practical, nor cost-effective, to maintain within the regular forces
- the potential for expansion in the future if required

The SDSR initiated the review of UK's reserve forces. Presented as a consultation paper in November 2012, this led to a White Paper, *The Reserves in the Future Force 2020*.<sup>3</sup> FR20 set the ambition for arresting the decline in the UK's reserve forces, building up their numbers, and organising and training them as part of an integrated whole force.<sup>4</sup> It envisaged the reserves providing a greater role in Defence and reservists themselves achieving higher recognition – from society for their commitment, from employers for being good employees and from their regular colleagues for their professionalism.



The FR20 programme improved the reserves' remuneration, equipment, infrastructure, training and employer engagement. The UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team's 2019 report into FR20 provided details of the growth in numbers across the reserves compared with the targets set. These numbers are reproduced in Figure 1.1 which shows that, while all three services achieved significant increases in their headcounts, only the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF) met its targets by the end of FR20.

The External Scrutiny Team concluded that FR20 had been largely successful.<sup>5</sup> They found that the decline of the reserves has been reversed, trained strength had increased, and that reserve forces were playing an increasing part in defence outputs. The achievements of FR20 have undoubtedly built a firm base on which to grow the capabilities of the reserves to meet the challenges of the next decade.

2 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review', October 2010, page 20.

3 Secretary of State for Defence, 'Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued', Command Paper 8655, July 2013.

4 An integrated approach underpinned by our people – regular and reserve service personnel, MOD civil servants, contractors and other civilians. Working together, these different groups form the 'whole force' which delivers defence outputs. Under the Whole Force Approach, Defence places human capability at the heart of its decision-making and ensures that outputs are delivered by the right mix of capable and motivated people now and in the future, and that people are managed as a strategic resource. Joint Concept Note 1/1 Future Force Concept, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, July 2017.

5 Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations, 'The UK Reserve Forces External Security Team Annual Report 2019', [http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-0874/Reserve\\_Forces\\_EST\\_Annual\\_Report\\_2019.pdf](http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-0874/Reserve_Forces_EST_Annual_Report_2019.pdf).

	1 April 2014	1 April 2015	1 April 2016	1 April 2017	1 April 2018	1 April 2019
Maritime Reserve						
Target	1,780	1,790	1,900	2,320	2,790	3,100
Actual	1,870	1,980	2,350	2,560	2,760	2,830
Army Reserve						
Target	18,800	19,900	20,200	22,900	26,100	30,100
Actual	20,060	21,030	23,030	26,660	26,960	27,070
Royal Auxiliary Air Force						
Target	1,200	1,400	1,600	1,860	1,860	1,860
Actual	1,440	1,620	1,890	2,150	2,480	2,660

**Figure 1.1** – Growth of reserve forces against the FR20 targets<sup>6</sup>

## 1.4 Future operating context

“Modernising will only get us so far – what is needed is a step-change in how we fight; in how we run the business; in how we develop our talent; in how we acquire our equipment; and in how we provide support – this requires transformation.”

**Chief of the Defence Staff, 2019<sup>7</sup>**

It follows that the reserves will continue to be needed to maintain credible contingent forces at readiness, both as a deterrent and to support the regular force. It also follows that if Defence structures itself to operate by persistently engaging with ongoing threats, then some of the contingent capabilities currently held in the regular force may be able to be delivered from the reserves at a lower readiness.

The recently published Integrated Operating Concept 2025 (IOpC 25) sets out the operating concept for the future joint force.<sup>8</sup> In his foreword, the Chief of the Defence Staff introduced the notion of ‘competition’ as the fifth ‘c’ in the traditional deterrence paradigm of comprehension, credibility, capability and communication. The IOpC 25 explains that this competition will routinely happen below the threshold of war, so while Defence’s principal purpose remains to fight, this will only be an episodic activity.

<sup>6</sup> Council of RFCAs External Scrutiny Team Report, 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Gen Sir Nick Carter, Annual Chief of the Defence Staff speech, Royal United Services Institute, 5 December 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, ‘Integrated Operating Concept 2025’, May 2020.



IOPC 25 illustrates how the character of warfare is changing. Competition will take place in the 'grey-zone' that blurs the boundary between peace and war.<sup>9</sup> The 'front' is no longer a physical thing that exists in a theatre of operations abroad, but sits inside our economic base, our networks, our supply chains, across the electromagnetic spectrum and intrudes into everyday living through social media networks. This is where reservists routinely work. Defence is now about much more than asserting the primacy of a narrowly-cast military force and it will increasingly require access to skills, expertise and networks not currently held in the regular force.

"A persistent competition demands a step change from an episodic mindset to one of persistent campaigning and engagement, increasingly controlled at the strategic level."

### IOPC 25

Three other concepts from IOPC 25 are key reasons for changing the reserves:

- **Retaining our conceptual edge.** The IOPC 25 speaks of the importance of selecting and developing our people and moving beyond a bottom-fed closed loop that only recruits at entry level and fills jobs with internal candidates.<sup>10</sup>



Lateral entry is already developing through specialist advisory groups. FR20 created opportunities for senior industry advisors to join the reserves as lateral-entry specialists. Some examples developed but not yet fully integrated into the whole force are:

Cyber advisory teams – Comprising starred and equivalent strategic consultants of international/national renown who advise MOD in relation to cyber and electromagnetic activities, working in the context of:

- an adversary mindset
- artificial intelligence
- information warfare
- robotics and future technology

The Army's Specialist Group Military Intelligence (SGMI) – PhD or equivalent level specialists, advising the Defence Intelligence community for both military and civil contingency operations.

The Army's Engineer and Logistics Staff Corps (ELSC) – Described in the media as 'probably the best military unit you have never heard of' after its senior advisors were instrumental in the delivery of Nightingale hospitals during COVID-19 in 2020.

The RAuxAF's 601 Squadron – Offers a similarly senior advisors group, providing access to networks to which the RAF has not traditionally been connected.

- **Multi-domain integration.** Integration across the domains of maritime, land, air, space and cyber is hampered by the different approaches that the single services have taken to the TACOS of their reserves. This is particularly prevalent in Strategic Command.

9 Elizabeth Braw's RUSI Briefing Paper, 'The case for Joint Military-Industry Greyzone Exercises', defines grey-zone aggression as aggression below the threshold of kinetic violence, [https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20200928\\_braw\\_greyzone\\_exercises\\_web.pdf](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20200928_braw_greyzone_exercises_web.pdf).

10 Integrated Operating Concept 2025, 1.8.

- **Redundancy and dispersal.** Defence must ensure its resilience by adopting systems of redundancy (where business continuity is non-discretionary) and systems of dispersal (where greater risk may be taken).<sup>11</sup>

Understanding these concepts has been at the forefront of the approach taken by the RF30 team and the language of the IOpC 25 is reflected throughout this review. This concept has been very specific of the need to ‘redesign and refocus’ the reserves to meet the needs of Defence.<sup>12</sup>

It is the principal reason we have identified for changing the reserves. The secondary reason for change is the need to respond to changes in the future workforce.

## 1.5 Workforce trends

### 1.5.1 Future working environment

The pace of change in the workplace is accelerating to such an extent that we do not yet know some of roles and skills that are going to be required in 2030.<sup>13</sup> Research by Deloitte suggests that 35% of UK jobs are at high risk of automation in the next 10 to 20 years.<sup>14</sup> However, while automation and artificial intelligence will increase, people will remain central. Deloitte predicts an increasing requirement for soft skills and expertise. So, while some jobs will be lost to automation, others will be created.

“We should automate work and humanise jobs. Let’s give the mundane to the machines and the purpose back to people.”

**Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, 2016<sup>15</sup>**

Increasing use of digital platforms and artificial intelligence will also increase our vulnerability to cyber-attacks and manipulation. The ability to protect our systems and recover from attacks, as well as to attack, deceive or deny our adversaries’ systems, will be increasingly important. Access to big data will allow us to understand our systems and those of our adversaries more clearly. This will bring vulnerabilities and opportunities to be protected and exploited.

Defence will need to attract the best talent from the future workforce, or share it with industry, to ensure that it remains in the vanguard of development.

### 1.5.2 The future workforce

By 2030, millennials or Generation Y will be aged between 30 and 50, and their Generation Z children will already be in the workplace.<sup>16</sup> In 2017, Generation Y already made up 82% of the US Army and, by 2025, Generation Z will form 45% of the enlisted cohort and 20% of the officer cohort.<sup>17</sup> It is reasonable to suggest that by 2030 the majority of British service personnel will be Generation Z. Tulgan and Martin described Generation Y as “a generation of new confidence, upbeat and full of self-esteem, the most education-minded generation in history, a generation paving the way to a more open, tolerant society” and as “a generation leading a new wave of volunteerism”.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Integrated Operating Concept 2025, 4.13.

<sup>12</sup> Integrated Operating Concept 2025, 8.20(g).

<sup>13</sup> PwC, ‘The workforce of the future: The competing forces shaping 2030’, 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Deloitte, ‘Talent for survival: Essential skills for humans working in the machine age’, 2016.

<sup>15</sup> The Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, ‘Supporting the disruptors and the disrupted: Harnessing technology for all’, Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture 2016, Centre for Policy Studies, 8 June 2016.

<sup>16</sup> Millennials are those born between 1981 and 2000. Generation Z were born between 2001 and 2020.

<sup>17</sup> Kanessa Trent, ‘Motivating and educating Millennials’, Journal of Military Learning, 2019.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce Tulgan and Carolyn Martin, ‘Managing Generation Y: Global citizens born in the late seventies and early eighties’, 2001. Referenced by Jennifer Kilber, Allen Barclay and Douglas Ohmer in ‘Seven tips for managing Generation Y’, 2014, Journal of Management Policy and Practice, volume 15(4), page 81.



Kilber and others suggest traits that characterise this generation include being unwilling to accept jobs they do not like and being prepared to switch jobs. How this workforce will be shaped in the post COVID-19 landscape is yet to be understood. Kilber goes on to suggest that successful employers will build a brand as a great place to work, offering flexible employment models, access to technology, remote working and meaningful career development. They will offer enhanced reward and recognition programmes, rather than a structured rank profile that can only be accomplished by very few.

“The era of persistent competition blurs traditional boundaries – war and peace, homeland defence and expeditionary operations, military and civilian roles and Defence and society.”

**Defence People Strategy Part 1,  
March 2020**

### **1.5.3 Defence People Strategy**

The characteristics of the future working environment, and expectations of the future workforce, mean that a new approach will be required across the whole force, not just the reserves. Many reservists are already experiencing these changes in their civilian employment and have expressed surprise that Defence is not yet adopting these new practices. The Defence People Strategy has been developed to modernise Defence’s workforce and, as Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate, many of the review’s recommendations are dependent on its successful implementation.



## 1.6 Reserves models from other nations

Before considering potential changes to the UK's reserves operating model, the review looked at reserve models used by the UK's allies. Three stood out: the Scandinavian, US and Australian models.

### 1.6.1 Scandinavian Total Defence

Scandinavian countries base their deterrence posture on an 'all-of-society' approach. Their Total Defence doctrine demands a collective preparedness to face war or crisis. This includes delivering government publications to every household explaining their responsibility in the face of war. In Sweden, every household knows that they need to be self-sufficient in food, fuel and medicines for seven days. In Finland, civilian organisations understand their role in the defence of the nation, be it the provision of vehicles, maintenance of strategic stockpiles or maintaining the military skills of the reserve force, which is in excess of 250,000 and expected to grow to 280,000.

This 'duty to contribute' extends to individuals, private companies and public organisations. It is enacted through a collaborative approach to security planning, with business leaders being part of the planning teams alongside their defence and civil contingency counterparts. Together, they identify critical needs and the best way of safeguarding them. To prepare for this, business leaders and captains of industry are included on defence and security education programmes so that a Total Defence community is established. They become used to working together and they operate from a single plan which they have all helped to design.

### 1.6.2 Reserves in the USA

The US Army and Air Force operate a three-component system, comprising regular forces, reserve forces and the National Guard. All units have well-defined roles and they place clear expectations on those who join. Strong incentives are offered on top of a basic salary to encourage people to join and remain committed – for example, they may apply for significant contributions towards the cost of their college

fees. For those who want to serve primarily in their own state, the National Guard and Air National Guard offer state roles. They can be called out by state governors for resilience or homeland security duties. This is different from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps reserves, who only have a federal mission. Nevertheless, all reflect the same standards, so new recruits, regardless of component, attend the same initial training together.

The US Navy and US Marine Corps do not have a corresponding National Guard but operate a similar system for their regulars and reserves. Building this common foundation instils a sense of a whole force from the start and eliminates any perception of different standards. Service personnel can also transfer easily between each component. This is a common occurrence, and the mantra is that individuals never leave the service but continue to contribute in different ways. This is a powerful paradigm that pervades the whole of the US defence force.

### 1.6.3 Reserves in Australia

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has spent the last 10 years implementing workforce transformation, with the aim of creating a single workforce with different service obligations. The aim of the programme was to create more effective defence outputs by using the workforce in a more efficient manner, so that individuals could contribute to the level that suited them. To give this clarity, seven service categories have been developed with three 'service options'.

The ADF has introduced formal shared-employment models that contract individuals with specific skills to be employed both by the ADF and commercial organisations to an agreed time pattern. This has removed some of the competition for talent between the ADF and industry and has allowed them both to maximise the benefit from expensive training. This has particular resonance with UK forces – the Royal Navy and RAF are already exploring how collaboration with industry over workforce employment can replace competition for talent.

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The ADF has enabled the management of its workforce through its online ForceNet IT platform. This provides the electronic means to create a Defence-wide online job centre that is secure but sits outside the core ADF IT bubble and is therefore accessible to all registered users. It advertises vacancies and allows individuals to apply online. While similar functionality exists in the UK's new SERVE application, it has yet to be fully enabled.


It is worth highlighting that a key lesson from the ADF's transformation was the need for the implementation team to include members of the original design team to ensure that 'golden threads' endured and momentum is maintained.

## **1.7 The way ahead**

For the reserves to meet the challenges of the future outlined in this chapter, this review has proposed four big ideas:

- redefine the reserves' relationship with society
- expand the role of the reserves
- unlock the potential of reservists
- transform support to the reserves

The next chapters expand on these ideas and make recommendations.



## Chapter 2

# Redefining the relationship between the reserves and society






# Chapter 2 – Redefining the relationship between the reserves and society

## 2.1 Introduction

If Defence is to access a broader pool of skills and expertise, provide a credible contingent capability, and enhance national resilience, it is likely that the demands on reservists and their employers will grow. If the RF30 proposition is to remain balanced, it follows that Defence will have to improve its offer (Figure 2.1). This chapter explores these two halves of the RF30 proposition from the perspectives of society, government and the private sector (Figure 2.2 provides a summary). Correctly calibrated, there is the potential to advance Defence's relationship with society, strengthening homeland defence and resilience, and advancing the government's objectives overseas. By doing so, the reserves will have an impact that is felt far more widely than just in Defence. This chapter demonstrates how the utility of reserves might be increased across society, government, industry and academia.



**Figure 2.1** – It is likely that modern threats and vulnerabilities will lead to a greater demand on reserve forces

## 2.2 Society

While the COVID-19 pandemic may have had a catalytic effect on how we think about resilience, the threats we now face are far broader and hybrid in nature. Delivering national resilience and credible deterrence requires co-operation between central government, its departments, local governing bodies, the private sector and the wider population. Yet the government's ability to do this is hampered by a number of factors, including:

- complex governance, stove pipes and duplication of effort across departments
- limited control over critical national infrastructure and the wider private sector
- a lack of understanding among ordinary citizens as to the part that they should play<sup>19</sup>

Military officers, senior officials and civilian commentators we spoke to argued that a different approach was required to address these challenges.<sup>20</sup>

This was introduced in the previous chapter with an overview of Scandinavian models of Total Defence. Many of the UK's allies from NATO and elsewhere pursue this approach.<sup>21</sup> While the manner in which these countries have applied it differs according to history, geography, economics and culture, the underlying approach remains the same. Total Defence requires a nation's civil military governance, structures and processes to be embedded into the function of state. At its most developed, this includes integrated systems across government and the private sector. To be an effective deterrent and response, it requires exercising at scale. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach makes a compelling argument that Total Defence could work for the UK, albeit in a more limited way.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Elisabeth Braw, Senior Research Fellow on RUSI's Modern Deterrence Project, 1 April 2020.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with The Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 20 July 2020.

<sup>21</sup> This includes all of our Joint Expeditionary Force partners (with the exception of the Netherlands) along with Austria, Switzerland, South Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and the Republic of Korea.

He suggests that now may be the time to consider innovative ways to generate mass, including the more creative use of the reserves.<sup>22</sup>

Reserves are distinct in many ways. Not only are they drawn from society, but they live, work and are connected to it in a way that their regular counterparts are not. Yet their military training, access and experience make them more naturally attuned and ready to respond to crises than most of their civilian counterparts. They possess local knowledge and access while operating in a national organisation with a centralised command and control system. Reservists can bridge the cultural divide between civilian and military responses to crises. Whether in response to natural/manmade disasters or cyber-attacks, the resilience of civil society should come from an approach that engages all of society.<sup>23</sup> The reserves could provide Defence with a mechanism to understand and respond to threats and vulnerabilities within the strategic base, critical national infrastructure and wider civil society.<sup>24,25</sup> Selling this to a society that has become detached from defence and security requires an honest conversation that cuts to the very heart of what it means to be a nation state, and requires government to provide an offer that is attractive to its citizens.

## 2.3 Government

### 2.3.1 Resilience

The reserves already play a significant part in Defence's contribution to resilience. While their primary role is to complement and enhance the armed forces' warfighting capabilities, they have also provided mass and expertise to support

resilience tasks. Work is underway to consider more defined resilience responsibilities for the reserves, in addition to their wider contingency roles.<sup>26</sup> The volunteer reserve will continue to be at the heart of this offering but, as the next chapter suggests, there is scope to further broaden Defence's contribution to resilience through a larger, less active, more strategic reserve. There are other, more novel approaches Defence could consider, but only with government direction and wider societal shift in thinking. The ideas that follow are designed to provoke thinking and do not represent current policy development.

Taking a wider approach to resilience based on Total Defence, the government could use the reserves as a means to bind the private sector, state and its citizens together.<sup>27</sup> For example, were the government to determine that there was a need for a National Citizen Service scheme, Defence could use non-uniformed ex-regular reservists to support a programme to educate those in school, college or early careers about the roles of the military and civilians in civil defence and resilience, and equip them with the skills and sense of service to make a meaningful contribution.<sup>28</sup> Government could also incentivise civilians in established careers to develop and share their skills and networks through the reserves on a part-time basis in return for a varied and meaningful contribution to national resilience.

Government might go further still and determine that firms that contribute to the strategic base and critical national infrastructure should also have a formal duty to guarantee their outputs. Again, this is somewhere Defence

22 Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO and former Chief of Defence Staff, 1 July 2020.

23 General (retired) Sir Richard Barrons, former Commander Joint Forces Command, interview by Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 5 July 2020.

24 The strategic base comprises military assets, national and international industrial capacity, civilian contractors and NHS hospitals. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations', 4th edition, July 2015, page 247.

25 Joint logistic enablers in the strategic base are primarily Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) delivered, and include: Defence support chain operations and movements, storage and distribution, mounting and recovery. Some are also delivered via single services – and now also UK Strategic Command, for example, air and sea ports of embarkation and the Joint Air Mounting Centre. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 'Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations' 4th Edition, July 2015 page 51.

26 The Army, through its Programme EMBANKMENT and the Reserves Strategy Team, is already suggesting a deeper and more defined resilience role for its reserve, leveraging local knowledge and the dispersal of forces.

27 Total Defence combines the armed forces and civil society in a comprehensive whole-of-society approach to security intended to deter an attack by making a target state a very challenging prospect for an aggressor. James Kenneth Wither, 'Back to the Future? Nordic Total Defence concepts', Defence Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, January 2020.

28 General (retired) Sir Nick Parker, Chairman RE:ACT, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 8 May 2020.





could contribute through its reservists, either through a partnership model (see section 2.4.2) or through sponsored reserves.<sup>29</sup> Sponsored reserves are employees whose employers have a formal relationship with MOD to provide a routine service.<sup>30</sup> They have a training liability with the MOD and can be mobilised to provide the same service in uniform. Use of sponsored reserves within the strategic base could improve collective understanding of risks across government, Defence and industry, particularly if the latter were to make an agreed number of ‘industry reservists’ available for planning and resilience exercises. They could also enable government, Defence and industry to be better prepared to respond to threats.

Timely decision-making in any time of tension is challenging, because every action sends a signal. The argument to involve wider society in responding to escalating grey-zone activity is likely to be especially challenging without exposing intelligence, escalating the situation or narrowing political choice. However, using sponsored reserves could enable low-key preparation to take place below the threshold of armed conflict, without telegraphing options, because sponsored reserves would be

exposed to military thinking while preparing as civilians, especially if their use in such tasks (such as exercising the outload of vehicles and stores) were part of everyday contracted activity. Sponsored reserves could also give greater assurance to government that outputs could be sustained in response to grey-zone activity and further escalation because they are demonstrably part of the armed forces, albeit with the majority of their work conducted as civilians.<sup>31</sup> It is for these reasons that this review believes Defence should consider including sponsored reserves as part of defence contracts associated with the strategic base.

An even more radical application of Total Defence would be for the government to determine that it needed to have contingencies in place with industry and society to rapidly scale military capability in the event of war. This could include the predetermined re-rolling of industry production lines to provide military equipment at pace, in the event that the Strategic Reserve needed to be activated. For this to be even considered, it would need to be a key factor in capability development.

29 See Section 3.4.2 for a more detailed description of sponsored reserves.

30 MOD, JSP 753, ‘Regulations for the Mobilisation of UK Reserve Forces Part 1: Directive’, version 4.0, paragraph 9, May 2015.

31 Attributed to Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Paul Newton, interviewed by the Chair of RF30, Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 10 June 2020.



These are challenging ideas that go well beyond the scope of this review. Implementing a philosophy of national citizen service or Total Defence, even in part, would represent a significant shift in policy for government. However, there are a number of ways Defence could use its reservists to improve resilience, even within the existing policy. More could be made of the reserves to anticipate crises by acting as a ‘strategic sentinel’ improving Defence’s ability to detect weak warning signs. Defence could work with other departments to increase the proportion of reservists across the public sector to improve collective situational awareness of civil vulnerabilities. This could include thickening our existing Joint Regional Liaison Officer Network to broaden and deepen links into local resilience forums. However, it is not just about how we prepare and anticipate for crisis, it is also about how we respond.

One particularly useful commodity provided by reservists during the initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic was access into private sector networks through senior industry experts serving as reservists.<sup>32,33</sup> The reserve could be used to expand this concept further under the framework proposed in the next chapter. Defence could also allocate secondary support resilience to the reserves – drawing on mass,

exploiting local knowledge and networks, and leveraging the nationwide reserves basing footprint. This could include optimising the capabilities of a number of units to support other departments’ resilience plans, for example medical co-responders. The reserves could also expand Defence’s resilience network by drawing on society’s latent appetite to volunteer. For instance, Defence could form a closer partnership with crisis response charities like RE:ACT.<sup>34</sup> However, this can only go so far. Charities answer to their boards, who may not wish to be aligned with Defence. Even if they were, they would be unlikely to deliver the scale required.<sup>35</sup> For that, the MOD could develop an offer that attracts ex-servicemen and women to remain connected to Defence through the reserve for resilience tasks. There may also be utility in developing mechanisms within a strategic reserve to onboard and co-ordinate the influx of civilian volunteers, at scale and at pace, in times of crisis.

### Recommendation

Increase the reserves’ contribution to UK resilience. Formalise the use of reserves within structured civil military co-operation. Increase the reserves’ role in improving the UK government’s ability to anticipate and respond to crises. Consider strengthening critical national infrastructure and the strategic base through greater use of the reserves.

### 2.3.2 Global Britain

Stability abroad strengthens resilience at home. Reservists within the UK are underused in this area and can do more to support the government’s Global Britain initiative by strengthening overseas networks, developing relationships and using soft power to advance

32 Lieutenant General Sir Tyrone Urch, Commander Standing Joint Command, described the Engineering and Logistic Staff Corps as a force multiplier during an interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 6 June 2020.

33 The Army, RAF, Defence Intelligence and Joint Cyber all have specialist advisor teams now contributing to niche areas of Defence.

34 Formerly Team Rubicon UK, RE:ACT is a charity that uses military veterans to respond to emergencies and crises in the UK and overseas.

35 General (retired) Sir Nick Parker, as above.

the UK's interests.<sup>36</sup> The use of reservists to project Global Britain has two principal advantages: their ability to build long-term personal relationships with allies, and their ability to leverage skills, expertise and networks from outside the regular force and employ them in support of activity overseas.

The short-term nature of military personnel rotations overseas (usually between 6 and 36 months) could be complemented by the use of reservists on an episodic but enduring basis. At the tactical level, reservists could be used more to provide continuity to regular teams and individuals as they rotate. At the operational and strategic levels there is no reason why relationships cannot be designed to last for years. For example, Defence might consider the long-term appointment of ex-regulars as reservist defence special advisors in Africa, Indo-Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and so on, choosing individuals with the right balance of regional and military experience.

Where the regular force might struggle to find suitably experienced personnel with the capacity to take on certain defence engagement tasks, the reserves could draw from existing pools of reservist talent. They could apply their civilian skillsets to activities such as partner force capacity development and assessment, exploiting links across the wider security sector, or understanding the detailed impact of serious organised crime. Not only is this of use to Defence but also to other government departments who might otherwise struggle to employ civilian skills in higher risk areas. Trained to operate in austere and non-permissive environments, reservists could provide a means to deliver civilian skills with a far higher degree of assurance than civilians without military training.

The same principle could be used for shorter-term consultancy tasks where there is currently more demand for official British military support than the regular component can deliver. This could be pursued through the imaginative application of the sponsored reserves model. There is considerable influence (and money) at stake for the provision of military capacity-building, and ex-regulars offer a huge pool of expertise that could be used by drawing them into the reserves. Bolted onto wider government-to-government offers that involve equipment sales and training, the offer of credible advice could be both financially and politically lucrative.<sup>37</sup>

As well as using reservists based in the UK to further defence engagement aims, there is also the opportunity to make greater use of those living abroad. This could include:

- using reservists based overseas to fill gaps in, or augment, the UK's NATO staff post liability
- building a network of expatriate and Commonwealth nationals to provide expert advice and access to overseas networks
- a more affordable mechanism for countries to access British forces' capability to complement loan service arrangements<sup>38,39</sup>

Some of these networks already exist, for example in ex-regulars in the Gulf, but are not widely used by Defence. Were the offer correctly calibrated, this could prove a powerful tool for Global Britain. The foundations for doing this have already been laid with the Overseas Based Volunteer Reservists Defence Information Note and Reserve Defence Attaché Corps.<sup>40,41</sup>

36 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Global Britain: delivering on our international ambition', 13 June 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition>.

37 General (retired) Sir Richard Barrons, as above.

38 General Stanford, Senior British Loan Service Officer Oman, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 11 May 2020.

39 Brigadier Stephen Cartwright, The Global Loan Service Review, interview with the RF30 team, 16 October 2020.

40 Defence People: Reserve Forces and Cadets, 'Overseas Based Volunteer Reservists', 2019DIN01-038, March 2019.

41 Defence Engagement Strategy are working with MOD to develop a Reserve Defence Attaché corps by identifying, training and maintaining a pool of reservists to mitigate short-term gaps in defence engagement structures, which will support defence sections during crises and to be able to surge manpower to meet demand.



### Global Britain example

Having grown up in Oman, Captain Oliver Blake moved to Muscat in 2013 to work for the late Sultan Qaboos in his commercial office, having completed a four-year commission with the Light Dragoons. Heavily involved with the Anglo-Omani Society and various bilateral initiatives focused on new generation co-operation, he offered his services to the UK as a reservist in support of defence engagement, diplomacy and outreach.

Understanding the Omani preference for long-term relationships and, given the high turnover of diplomatic staff and loan service personnel, he soon became invaluable in providing continuity, context and access to in-country networks. He has supported over 10 ambassadors, defence attachés and Senior British Loan Officers and provided advice to MOD's Middle East teams. Attached to the Army's UK-based 51st Infantry Brigade, he has provided cultural briefings to British regiments deploying on joint exercises and has supported a number of strategic engagements including: Exercise SAIF SAREERA 3, the Joint Defence Agreement and His Highness Sayyid Haitham's visit to the Edinburgh Military Tattoo in 2018 (now His Majesty Sultan Haitham). During the succession period and ongoing reform, his role as a reservist has enabled him to use four decades of local knowledge to contribute to a wider UK understanding of Oman as Britain seeks to cement its trade and defence relationship with the Sultanate.

There are many other ex-regulars and expats like Captain Blake in the Middle East and beyond who would be prepared to share local knowledge and expertise.

The reserves are not the panacea for Defence's offer to Global Britain, but they do provide a means to complement and significantly enhance its contribution through continuity of engagement and access to skills and expertise. Conversations with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office were enthusiastic about these ideas.<sup>42</sup> However, greater use of reservists in this way would of course need to be balanced against potential conflicts of interests.

### Recommendation

Increase Defence's contribution to Global Britain through use of reserves. Leverage reservists' skills, expertise and networks to strengthen overseas networks, develop relationships and use soft power to advance the UK's interests.

## 2.4 Private and public sector

The previous sections on society and government focused on where Defence could make a greater contribution to resilience and to the Global Britain initiative through greater use of its reserves. If these were implemented, it would represent a significant increase of what is asked of the private sector, both as employers of reservists and delivering military outputs as part of the whole force. This section considers the nature of the reserve model from the perspective of employers, as well as suggesting how reservists might be used to improve private sector integration into the whole force.

### 2.4.1 Employers

The firms we spoke to were quick to acknowledge the benefits of working with Defence. At the basic level it provided them with the opportunity to demonstrate to shareholders that they were delivering profit with purpose.<sup>43</sup> They were enthusiastic about the benefits of employing reservists, in particular the soft skills they brought, including leadership,

42 Samantha Job, FCDO Director Defence and International Security, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 24 June 2020.

43 Jim Hart, Managing Director DHL, interview with RF30 team, 13 May 2020.

communication, adaptability, work ethic and loyalty.<sup>44</sup> They also saw value in the Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS), in particular the access it gave them to a wider network and business development opportunities.<sup>45,46</sup> It was clear that employer engagement has been transformed by the establishment of the Defence Relationship Management organisation and employers enjoyed an effective and clear channel of communication with MOD.<sup>47</sup> However, these benefits were viewed as being difficult to quantify in commercial terms and were at best modest when set against criteria to qualify for ERS awards and the risks companies felt they carried by employing reservists. There was an overwhelming view that the offer to employers needed to be improved if Defence was to make greater demands on its reservists. A review of ERS is already underway, including an assessment of the various levels of award, to ensure the scheme delivers tangible benefits to reserves and the armed forces community.<sup>48</sup>



Clarity about what reserve service means for civilian employers, in terms of commitment, purpose and nature of roles must form the first part of any offer. Time and again, private sector firms told us that they viewed reservists as individuals who they might have to replace in times of crisis.<sup>49</sup> This was felt even more acutely for small and medium enterprises with less capacity to absorb absences. Firms wanted a clearer understanding of the warning time they could expect before releasing an employee to a defence task, the length of the commitment, and, most importantly, where there might be scope for flexibility.<sup>50</sup> Increased emphasis on the reserves providing contingent capability could unsettle employers, particularly given the limited visibility most have of reservists within their firms and of the ex-regular reserve recall liability. The framework outlined in the next chapter will allow reservists and Defence to have these conversations with employers and provide them with the assurances they need. Defence's engagement with employers is a congested space and this needs to be handled carefully to ensure that the messaging is consistent across multiple channels.<sup>51</sup>

The review considered a number of incentives that employers told us would be attractive to them, particularly those who were part of the ERS. These are summarised on the outer ring of the private sector slice of Figure 2.2, with increasing material benefit to the employer.

44 Gillian Russell, Military Program Manager (EMEA), Amazon, 29 October 2020.

45 Lisa Marr, Veterans' Employment Transition Support Programme Manager, 26 October 2020.

46 The Employer Recognition Scheme encourages employers to support Defence. It encompasses bronze, silver and gold awards for employer organisations that pledge, demonstrate or advocate support to Defence and the armed forces community, and align with the Armed Forces Covenant.


47 Defence Relationship Management partners with organisations throughout the UK, helping them understand the value of signing the Armed Force Covenant and building mutually beneficial partnerships with Defence. It provides support on employing reservists, veterans, cadet force adult volunteers and military spouses and improving fairness for the Armed Forces community in the consumer market.

48 Colonel Lance Patterson, Head Employer Engagement, Reserves Forces and Cadets, interview with RF30 team, 15 October 2020.

49 Iain Harrison, Director Strategic Engagement (Land) QinetiQ, interview by RF30 team, 30 May 2020.

50 Chris Recchia, Partner Deloitte, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 15 May 2020.

51 Forces in Mind Trust, 'Benefit not Burden: How to improve the delivery of organisational pledges made under the Armed Forces Covenant', January 2019, page 6.



**Figure 2.2** – The reserve forces principal stakeholders (excluding Defence and reservists themselves)



“Industry is part of our force structure. We are dependent on industry to perform and, if we do not have a healthy industry, we do not have a healthy force.”

US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2012<sup>52</sup>



<sup>52</sup> The Hon Frank Kendall, US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 'Better Buying Power Initiative 2.0', Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012.

Skills, expertise and networks are a precious commodity for the private sector and recruitment is a significant cost. We were told that increased visibility of service leavers' skills and expertise would be of significant interest to the private sector. We have focused on the private sector here, but relationships with public sector employers such as the NHS and other government departments are equally important, and perhaps better established.<sup>53</sup> The work ongoing within Defence to move to a common skills framework would certainly aid this.<sup>54</sup> This need not be a one-way process. Discussions with Airbus revealed that their apprenticeship programmes were often oversubscribed by a factor of 10:1 and that they would welcome the mechanism to signpost appropriate candidates into Defence.<sup>55</sup>

Training is another area where Defence could potentially improve its offer to employers. For example, sharing the cost of apprenticeships and potentially providing university bursaries in return for a period of service shared between Defence and industry would lock in the costs of training to the enterprise as a whole.<sup>56</sup> Employers highlighted the value of having access to military leadership and management courses and requested that this be broadened. Organisations often find it challenging to promote individuals from within to senior leadership positions, as they lack the formal leadership and management training. Employers also highlighted the value of increasing the amount of exchange programmes with Defence. Our discussions revealed that these programmes were an excellent way of promoting the armed forces, and more should be done to use to attract individuals into the reserves. Attachments should also be used towards the end of

individuals' careers with the deliberate aim of placing ex-regulars in certain companies to strengthen the whole force.

The final two areas worthy of consideration involve the direct financial incentivisation of employers. Both would require more detailed discussions with central government and HM Treasury. The first is establishing an agreed rationale to create tax incentives or National Insurance rebates for firms that employ reservists. The second involves relooking at competition rules in a post-Brexit environment to determine how companies that support reservists might be appropriately credited during scoring of tenders for government contracts. This is more relevant for firms that directly contribute to the whole force.

## **2.4.2 Industry's role in the whole force**

The idea of the whole force was first articulated by Lord Levene as the Whole Force Concept in 2011.<sup>57</sup> It proposed that defence outputs be delivered through a balance of regular, reservists, civilians and contractors. This concept has gone through several relaunches since, first as the Whole Force Approach and then Whole Force by Design. The underlying strategic logic has strengthened to the point that the whole force has become fundamental for delivering future operational capability.<sup>58</sup> However, practical implementation of the whole force remains patchy.

53 At the strategic level, Defence Medical Services is a joint partner in the MOD-NHS partnership board, which includes a reserves representative and working groups within the devolved administrations. At the operational level, HQ Defence Medical Services Group and the Department of Health and Social Care jointly fund an NHS Employers programme to support reserves and employers across NHS Trusts and primary healthcare. A key part of this has been the establishment of reserve champions in trusts and health boards.

54 Jamie Black, Strategic Development Director SERCO, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 2 April 2020.

55 Jeremy Greaves, UK Corporate Affairs and Strategy Airbus, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 31 March 2020.

56 This is developed in more detail in the next chapter.

57 Lord Levene of Portsoken, 'Defence Reform: An independent report into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence' June 2011, page 57, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/27408/defence\\_reform\\_report\\_struct\\_mgt\\_mod\\_27june2011.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27408/defence_reform_report_struct_mgt_mod_27june2011.pdf).

58 David Galbreath, 'Investigating the Whole Force Approach: Whitehall, the Army, and the private sector: working towards a genuine partnership', The occasional papers of the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research: ARES and ATHENA 2, winter 2015-16.

The Serco Institute identified a number of reasons for this, including in part, cultural frictions between the military and industry.<sup>59</sup> Perhaps most significantly, it identified concerns from the military about the ability of industry to deliver assured outputs in the short term and the perceived impact that ‘contracting out’ military capabilities could have on in-house expertise and force structures in the longer term. The private sector cites a sometimes adversarial relationship with Defence with, poor requirement setting, inflexible contracts and unreasonable transfer of risks. These are legitimate concerns and will only be overcome if Defence can find a way to move beyond the traditional client-supplier relationship. The study notes that the key to improving the relationship is the development of trust and incentives to work collaboratively. It concludes that, if this partnership model is better implemented, any risks in embracing the whole-force model are significantly outweighed by potential benefits. The private sector has two roles as part of the whole force. The first is the provision of military equipment, equipment support and training, and the second is the delivery of routine tasks, either within the home base or overseas. The reserves could play a greater role in both and in doing so improve industry’s integration into whole force.

Defence sector executives spoke of the need for an ‘intelligent customer’. This was more than just full-time military staff and civil servants staying in post or specialisms longer. It needed to include people who had a ‘foot in both camps’, who understood the culture, language and processes of both Defence and the private sector, and who were able to draw on their networks across both. Ex-regulars can do this to a certain extent, but they have a shelf life when it comes to business development.<sup>60</sup> Reservists might be useful here, providing there is a way to ensure government competition regulations are met and one supplier was not unfairly advantaged.

Taking this one step further, Defence could consider assigning certain positions to industry reservists on a part-time basis with a view to sharing talent with the private sector.<sup>61</sup> This could give the former access to innovation and emerging thinking, while giving the latter access to the end user. Insight, skills and experience would flow in both directions.<sup>62</sup> This has merits well beyond the defence sector and could be the natural extension of the Enterprise Approach.<sup>63</sup> It could not only prove advantageous to large prime contractors who would benefit from the closer contact with their principal partner, but also to small and medium firms who might find the opportunity to share the costs of labour attractive as they incrementally grow. Defence is already considering streams that would benefit from the through-career movement of people between the MOD and private sector through an integrated career structure with a common skills framework. This should be developed with the reservist as well as regular in mind.

59 Serco Institute, ‘The Whole Force by Design: Optimising Defence to Meet Future Challenges’, October 2020.

60 Jeremy Greaves, as above.

61 Jamie Black, as above.

62 Clare Cameron, Director Defence Innovation MOD, interview with Brigadier The Lord Lancaster, 15 April 2020.

63 The Enterprise Approach establishes collaborative relationship with the private sector to pool resources where they are most needed. The goal is to realise the commitment set out in SDSR (2015) to “work collaboratively with industry to make skills available across organisational boundaries”. The approach specifically aims to: test the concept of a Defence Enterprise; attract, develop and retain critical skills; alter MOD’s relationship with industry from contractual to collaborative; enable solutions to shared problems to be commercially supported; make skills available across organisational boundaries; and enable the flexible movement of personnel.



Initiated in 2013, the Cyber Reserve programme has been successful in raising four new units to work alongside their regular counterparts. The programme has attracted high-end recruits from industry and academia into an offensive cyber unit, defensive cyber unit and two information assurance units. Most recruits have graduate and postgraduate degrees, with 12 individuals holding PhDs. These units work alongside their regular counterparts and feed industry-leading capabilities into Defence, for example threat hunting. The cyber reserves are often requested to support other areas, including the Defence Cyber School, special forces and the broader upskilling of regular personnel.

A related concept would be a sponsored partnership between industry and specified units. These partnerships could cover a wide range of industry ‘overlaps’ such as engineering, signals, aviation, intelligence, diving and many others. Membership of such units should never be confined to employees of the partnered company – but in some cases, they may increase the closeness by, for example, appointing a senior executive of the company as an honorary colonel. This was demonstrated during a recent 507 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Railway Infrastructure) exercise. Combining engineering skills from across Defence and the railway industry to review current capability, many of the exercising reservists were employed by Network Rail including a Network Rail board director who is the industry representative with the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps.

Finally, there is the opportunity to formally contract a portion of the private sector's workforce for routine and deployed use by the military under the sponsored reserves model. For example, KBR Group's delivery of heavy equipment transporters that provides routine civilian support to the Army can also deliver military support for exercise and operations.<sup>64</sup> When on duty, they wear military uniform, come under military command and are subject to military law. The Voyager AirTanker consortium is another example, with RAF sponsored reserves fully integrated alongside full-time squadrons.<sup>65</sup> There are currently 510 sponsored reserves, primarily employed in logistic and equipment support functions (although this excludes Royal Fleet Auxiliary numbers). While this represents a modest increase from 460 in 2012,<sup>66</sup> this hardly meets the level of ambition envisaged in the 2013 reserves White Paper, something that was described as a missed opportunity during SDSR 2015.<sup>67</sup>

Use of sponsored reserves has a number of advantages. They enable the military to access deep subject knowledge, skills and continuity that is difficult to generate or maintain within Defence. They allow the military to access and pay for this expertise only when they need it without having to worry about the overheads (such as equipment, maintenance and accommodation). Not only does the model offer a cost-effective way to achieve the operational effect, but it also benefits the individuals who are generally paid more than their commercial counterparts.<sup>68</sup>

64 The KBR Group (FTX Logistics Ltd) contract made up one-third of the heavy equipment transporter drivers deployed on operation HERRICK and TELIC.

65 Recruited and employed by AirTanker, this includes a dedicated team of sponsored reserve pilots and engineers who deploy operationally.

66 Recent Defence statistics suggest pre-June 2014 sponsored reserve numbers may have been overstated.

67 Paul Wyatt, Director National Security Policy MOD, interview with RF30 team, 2 April 2020.

68 Steve Lawton, Managing Director KBR (FTX), interview with RF30 team, 7 May 2020.

19 Tank Transporter Squadron, Royal Logistic Corps is the only UK-based squadron providing HETs to the British Army. The squadron combines sponsored reserves, provided by KBR's FTX Logistics Ltd, and regular personnel with state-of-the-art heavy lift equipment. Out of uniform, FTX Logistics provides a commercial driving service, meaning that personnel gain valuable experience and maintain civilian qualifications. When required, FTX Logistics provides drivers who can operate in uniform as an integral part of 19 Squadron, subject to military law and able to go wherever they are needed. The only difference is that they continue to be paid by FTX, rather than the MOD.

Sponsored reserves provide the military with assured access to contractor support that is under military command and is subject to military law when in use on exercise or operations. When not being used by the military, this capability is reinvested within the private sector, maintaining currency and exposure to the latest innovations. Sponsored reserves benefit the private sector as they give them guaranteed funding streams, greater insight into defence and could even improve their integration into the whole force. Increased use of sponsored reserves would likely benefit the veteran community, as the private sector would look to employ individuals who understand and are culturally attuned to the military.

However, sponsored reserves are not the panacea. Defence, Front Line Commands and industry would benefit from an honest conversation about where they should, and should not, be used. The review identified a number of areas that deserve further consideration beyond the more traditional application of sponsored reserves in logistic and equipment support roles. This includes the provision of:

- sponsored reserves to address service human resourcing issues, particularly in pinch-point trades<sup>69</sup>
- technical skills that Defence is unable to develop or maintain
- functional skills and expertise, for example certain contract support, HR and finance roles where Defence would benefit from routinely contracted input
- training support enabling hard-pressed operational units to focus on being trained rather than training others
- consultants to support defence engagement

Perhaps most importantly, there needs to be a discussion on the potential uses of sponsored reserves in the context of UK resilience that were outlined in the previous section.

This discussion also needs to consider risk. Defence needs to understand industry's tolerance for putting its employees in harm's way, not just in semi-permissive and non-permissive environments, but in the face of grey-zone activity in the strategic base. This should include physical and non-traditional threats, for example the targeted use of cyber. A discussion is required on how to establish simple, flexible contractual relationships that share risks across the enterprise. The viability of the model also requires a thorough assessment of the through-life costs of employing sponsored reservists set against the alternatives, whether that be regular, reserve or contractor.

### Recommendation

Broaden and deepen Defence's partnerships with the private sector through the reserves. Increase senior private sector engagement, expand use of sponsored reserves, improve employer incentives. Expand the Enterprise Approach to include the sharing of reservists between the private sector and Defence.

<sup>69</sup> Trades facing structural manning issues requiring recruitment and/or retention measures for resolution.

### 2.4.3 Academia and innovation

The reserves offer the opportunity of building links with universities, not just through existing university service units, but also through specialist reserve units and by employing academic reservists. Universities provide access to networks of innovative research and development, cognitive diversity and critical friends. In return, universities could contribute to the national security debate and gain access to resources for research and experimentation in a live environment.


Cambridge University Officers Training Corps is developing an ecosystem with the University of Cambridge's engineering department, the Cambridge Network (an affiliation of several hundred deep technology businesses and academics) and the Army's Future Force Development directorate. This partnership synchronises and stimulates funding, research and innovation in areas such as autonomous systems, power generation, artificial intelligence and decision support.

### 2.4.4 A vision for private and public sector integration

A lot of work has already been done by Defence to develop the whole force, but its application

has been patchy. Now is the time for Defence to accelerate cultural change. Only then will it be able to bridge the gap between a well-founded understanding of the strategic imperative for the whole force to wholesale implementation at a local level. Finding the regular/reserve alchemy is only part of the challenge – it must also include integration with the private sector and wider public sector. This cultural change must be command-led, underpinned by doctrine and education, and make novel uses of the reserve forces in the ways articulated in this chapter.

The Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone (MEZ) is a Royal Navy initiative to bring together government, industry and academia to create a maritime hub around the Solent in the south of England. Combining this initiative with the RF30 recommendations will allow the visions for both to flourish. Multi-employer apprenticeships, shared employment models and the greater use of sponsored reserves will allow the Royal Navy, industry and academia to share the costs of training for entry into the maritime industry and remove competition for talented individuals thereafter. Sponsored reserves working in industry and reserves working in academia will support the Royal Navy as required in uniform and will be able to transition in and out as they wish, in response to the needs of each organisation.




**Figure 2.3** – The Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone



“The Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone ... will underpin the country’s maritime industry and therefore provide economic stability and prosperity in support of a globally engaged UK.”

Second Sea Lord and Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 2020<sup>70</sup>



<sup>70</sup> Vice Admiral Nick Hine CB, Second Sea Lord and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in ‘The Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone: Inspired by the needs of the future maritime generation’. Royal Navy and Solent Local Enterprise Partnership, 20 January 2020.

### **A fictional scenario set in 2025**

Tom, Tammy and Trish all want to be engineers in the maritime sector. They are successful in their applications to Portsmouth University to study maritime engineering. During their degree, they all join the Royal Naval Reserve (Engineering Branch) and complete initial and trade training. They have industry placements with defence contractors that are part of the Solent MEZ and also with the Royal Navy.


On graduation, Tammy joins the Royal Navy as an engineering officer and, because she has already completed her initial and trade training and has an engineering degree, she is able to join her ship immediately (her final industry placement was on board this ship so she is fully qualified). She plans to complete three years at sea as a member of a dual crew on this warship and then spend time in industry to give herself some proper shore time and wider experience. She can return to the Royal Navy at any time and in a rank that reflects her skills and knowledge.

Tom wants to complete a masters in maritime engineering, so stays on at university. After that, he wants to teach engineering. He is a fully qualified member of the Royal Naval Reserve and supports the engineering branch in uniform in his spare time. He volunteers for a three-month deployment on board the new Type 31 as an engineering officer.

Trish enjoyed her industry placement during her degree and, because she is a fully trained reservist, she applies for a place as a sponsored reserve with a defence contractor that has the contract for providing a new capability for the Royal Navy. In this role, she is providing on-board maintenance, both at sea and in a secure military port overseas. Although she is in uniform and subject to military law, she continues to be paid at her professional rate by her employer.

Trayton wants to be a maritime engineer but doesn't want to go to university. Instead, he applies for an apprenticeship that is co-sponsored by BAE Systems and the Royal Navy. He applied for this apprenticeship specifically because it gives him the experience of engineering in industry and the Royal Naval Reserves. It will allow him to work in both organisations, sometimes in uniform and sometimes as a civilian. When he is working for BAE Systems, he will be part of the Reinforcement Reserves, working in his spare time to support engineering in the dockyard. He enjoys this as it keeps his knowledge current, BAE Systems like it because Trayton can help develop new equipment for the Royal Navy, and the Royal Navy likes it because they can call on Trayton's skills, even when he is working for BAE Systems. It is a win-win-win situation.





## Chapter 3

# Expanding the role of the reserves





# Chapter 3 – Expanding the role of the reserves

## Key observations

The roles of the reserves need to expand to meet future challenges. This chapter outlines a framework on which to hang these new roles as they develop.

Reservists do not just fulfil a contingency function, able to generate surge military capability in a crisis, but increasingly they also deliver an active function, where they reinforce the routine operation of the regular forces.

There is a growing demand to widen military access to cognitive diversity, skills and networks developed in the civil sector. Reservists could act as a conduit to these capabilities.

Expanding the use of reservists in active posts in support of the routine operation of the armed forces could enhance capability, increase value for money, widen diversity and reduce the negative effects of trawling units at short notice to fill gaps elsewhere. A mechanism to support this expansion would be to establish a dedicated Reinforcement Reserve.

The pivot of the regular forces towards constantly operating against security threats will dictate the need for the reserves to contribute more of Defence's warfighting capabilities because they should be less frequently required. This will mean the traditional role of the reserves in delivering contingency forces will need to be enhanced, which would require the development of an assured Operational Reserve.

The imperative to deepen the resilience of the armed forces and the nation dictates the need to revitalise the ex-regular reserve forces and rebuild a Strategic Reserve, whose capability has diminished steadily since the Cold War.

The ability to deliver this framework is hindered by legislation, headcount targets, the MOD financial operating model and its culture.

## 3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines how the roles of the reserves should evolve to meet the challenges laid out in Chapters 1 and 2. In doing so it introduces a new framework for the reserves.

## 3.2 Contingent versus active

Engagement with senior commanders confirms there is a desire to draw greater utility from their reserve forces. They no longer see them as only fulfilling a contingency function, but increasingly delivering an active function, where they reinforce routine defence activity. Examples of the latter include:

- more than 5,000 reservists filling full-time jobs
- reservists paid to work on short-term projects
- ex-regulars who support RAF base support operations on demand
- volunteer reserve units who support operations as part of their normal duties, often at weekends, such as some members of the Joint Cyber Group

To reflect the development of this active function, the armed forces should adopt the language of contingent and active functions when describing the core functions of the reserves.

## 3.3 Reinforcement Reserve

Using reservists to provide active support to routine defence outputs, projects and exercises offers a number of advantages. They can:

- provide surge capacity with access to the skills, expertise and networks of individuals who are culturally attuned to Defence, speak the same 'language' and understand its processes



- widen access to specialist capabilities and deep expertise that are best developed and maintained in the civil sector – some might be technical, such as engineering or medical skills, while others could be functional like project management, HR or finance
- offer access to ex-regular military experience to free up or complement regular activity, with the added benefit of giving Defence a greater return on the investment these individuals received during their regular service
- provide continuity on projects and people by providing long-term and/or periodic support, for example, on a complex procurement programme or managing a relationship with a partner overseas
- fill workforce gaps and improve the stability of organisations by filling short-notice jobs that would otherwise be filled by trawling regular units (which means creating gaps elsewhere)
- increase the diversity of the military workforce
- flex their commitment to meet the needs of a job – not all posts require full-time deployable personnel, so using reservists as required

could save money (potentially including money otherwise spent on consultancy services)

Reservists we interviewed offered a variety of reasons for being attracted to these opportunities, including the potential to do the following:

- serve more than in their spare time but without the commitment of regular service
- focus their contribution to active, ongoing tasks without having to also be a member of a reserve organisation designed for crisis response
- achieve more choice and control over how they offer their services
- use specialist skills and expertise
- directly support an organisation they have served with before
- work on a specific project they value
- provide them with opportunities to improve civilian employability by expanding their civilian skills in a military context and developing their leadership and management experience



The growth of the use of reservists in active jobs is a positive trend but is constrained by MOD processes which were designed when reservists were primarily used as a contingent capability. Therefore, there is a need to introduce new measures to energise and enable this emerging active reserve jobs market. This includes mechanisms to:

- improve the visibility of the skills and expertise held by reservists
- find new talent outside Defence – a digital platform supported by a network of Defence recruiters who would be enabled to find talent outside of the normal Defence HR system

It would also require top-level budgets to identify workforce requirements that individuals could be hired into. Finally, it would need an agile workforce management system that enabled individuals to be hired at the point of need, in weeks rather than months, and with appropriate conditions of service.<sup>71</sup> These ideas are discussed in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. Growth of this market would need to be balanced against maintaining sufficient deployable regular staff and regular career opportunities, but these conditions are unlikely to significantly constrain development.

To ensure this opportunity is properly resourced, managed and advertised, a new reserve element should be established: the Reinforcement Reserve.

### 3.4 Operational Reserve

The reserve forces' traditional role of maintaining surge capability for contingencies will become more important as the armed forces adapt to the IOpC 25. As the regular forces operate more as a persistent global presence, then the armed forces will have to rely more on their reserves to maintain a greater share of their contingent capability to be able to fight in a conflict. This will undoubtedly involve certain capabilities currently held in the regular force being transferred to the reserves and delivered at lower readiness.

Several factors need to be considered when determining whether or not a contingent capability can be credibly delivered from the reserves, particularly the ability to maintain the right levels of training to mobilise in time to achieve tasks. The ability of the reserves to deliver combat capabilities can be difficult, especially collective capabilities. Modern military equipment can require significant training time and resources to maintain and operate effectively. Today's duty-of-care regimes demand levels of professional competence and oversight that can be



71 The Defence People Strategy and single-service work such as programmes CASTLE and ASTRA already support this direction of travel.

hard to achieve and maintain in traditional military functions in a spare-time role. For example, reservists volunteering to serve in Afghanistan as rifle platoon commanders first had to pass the regular version of the platoon commander's course.

The size and shape of each unit will be a key factor in determining its ability to achieve critical mass when required, either for training or mobilisation. The nature of reserve service will probably require units to hold a larger complement of reservists, to guarantee the necessary mass to deploy – similar to how a lifeboat station will call out more crew members than are needed to ensure a rapid response. Contingent units will require a sliding scale of full-time input from a spine of regular and/or full-time reserve staff to manage and administer the unit, to the establishment of hybrid regular/reserve organisations.<sup>72</sup> Contingent forces will need access to modern, network-enabled synthetic training solutions. Front Line Commands will require digital solutions that provide them with the ability to monitor and assure readiness levels. Reservists in these roles will need stronger incentives to guarantee their commitment, such as education and training bursaries, and employers will need greater compensation so that they are not disadvantaged.

Whatever form reserve organisations that regularly train for contingency operations take, for reasons of clarity, they should be grouped into an Operational Reserve. This Operational Reserve could be used in active tasks as well but it must remain resourced and trained primarily to deliver its contingent tasks. As the previous chapter argues, they should also be considered for additional resilience roles in support of other government outputs.



### Recommendation

Undertake a review to identify how the reserve forces might do more to support contingent capabilities currently held exclusively in the regular force (with appropriate enhancements in training and unit structures).

## 3.5 Strategic Reserve

The capability of the ex-regular reserve forces has eroded steadily since the end of the Cold War. The removal of the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union diminished the imperative for maintaining a strategic reserve. The added mass that ex-regular reserve forces could provide beyond the mobilisation of the volunteer reserve no longer appeared to warrant more than the bare minimum of investment, denting its utility and credibility.

<sup>72</sup> The Army's EMBANKMENT programme continues its future force design work with reserves advisors embedded, and with reserves structures and outputs as a central whole-force consideration.

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The return of state-based threats and the risks from manmade and natural disasters have changed the logic of this argument. It dictates the need to revitalise the Strategic Reserve.

It is envisaged that the Strategic Reserve will be held at much lower readiness than the Operational Reserve. It will largely be made up of individuals rather than units and built around those who have recently left the regular forces but are still legally committed to be called out. However, it should be open for any ex-regulars and ex-reservists who wish to continue to serve in the Strategic Reserve. The Strategic Reserve will provide mass as well as certain niche skills that Defence finds hard to regenerate, for example, ex-regular helicopter pilots who are retaining their flying currency in the private sector. Commitment levels would be kept very low (perhaps limited to a short update activities and administrative check once a year). However, to be a credible part of the MOD's overall deterrent, a portion of the Strategic Reserve would have to be periodically tested as part of wider mobilisation exercises.

The Strategic Reserve will also have an important national resilience role, with an option for individuals to volunteer to support local communities in unpaid roles in the event of an emergency without being called out as reservists. The Strategic Reserve might even be used to provide an onboarding facility to cohere civilian volunteers in the event of crisis. These ideas are covered in more detail in the next chapter.

There are other reasons for reinvigorating the Strategic Reserve. Increasing levels of engagement with ex-regulars will encourage some to:

- rejoin the armed forces
- transfer into the Operational Reserve
- offer their expertise to the Reinforcement Reserve
- volunteer as unpaid workers in a crisis
- mentor junior members of the armed forces
- act as advocates for Defence to employers and communities

It will also help veterans' transition into civilian life. To achieve these goals would require a marketing and management capability that engages with and incentivises ex-regulars and former reservists to continue contributing to Defence.



### 3.6 Reserve framework

Drawing together the observations above, the reserve forces should be given a new set of roles. These should include the requirement to:

- generate surge capabilities for contingencies currently held exclusively in the regular forces
- offer an alternative source of diverse talent to fill workforce requirements
- widen access to specialist capabilities that are best maintained in the civil sector
- strengthen the resilience of the armed forces and the nation



This framework is set out below and in Figure 3.1.

#### Recommendation

To support new reserve roles, the review recommends reconfiguring the reserves into the following framework consisting of three reserve elements with a mechanism that allows seamless movement between each:

##### Create a Reinforcement Reserve


An auxiliary capability that delivers or supports ongoing defence activities. It provides opportunities for existing reservists to use their military or civilian expertise, and for Defence to attract new reservists to access their civilian skills and networks without them having to be members of reserve organisations dedicated to a contingent response. Reinforcement reservists would be managed within dedicated workforce pools or units.

##### Create an Operational Reserve

A routinely trained and assured reserve capability to respond to defence tasks at times of crisis. It consists of units and some individual reservists held at readiness. It can also be used to deliver ongoing defence tasks as long as these do not impinge on its ability to respond to a crisis. Assured output would be delivered through resilient units (where necessary larger, and with a reserve/regular balance calibrated according to role).

##### Create a Strategic Reserve

A latent surge capacity. It consists of reservists who are not normally available for routine duty but can deliver, across a spectrum of lower readiness, a contingent capability that can be called out either as reservists or utilised as non-uniformed unpaid volunteers. While largely dormant, the Strategic Reserve is a key component of the deterrent and parts of it would require to be periodically exercised for UK resilience and homeland defence.



### Key



**Active:**  
Delivering routine defence tasks.



**Contingent:**  
Delivering defence tasks at readiness, called out at times of crisis.

### Reinforcement Reserve:

An auxiliary capability that delivers or supports ongoing defence activities.

### Operational Reserve:

A routinely trained and assured capability responding to defence tasks at times of crisis.

### Strategic Reserve:

A latent surge capacity.

**Figure 3.1** – Recommended reserves framework

### 3.7 A more integrated force

To make best use of this new reserve framework, the regular and reserve forces would need to take the next step towards full integration. To achieve this goal, we have identified four barriers that would need to be overcome:

#### Legislation

Legislation and bureaucracy restrict the free movement of members of the armed forces back and forth between regular and reserve service. They also limit the options for simplifying commitment types and increasing their flexibility.

#### Recommendation

Consider legislative change to support the closer integration of reserve and regular service, which might require the merger of the Armed Forces Act and Reserve Forces Act.

#### Funding

There are number of challenges in funding reservists. First, there is the issue of using a reservist in a crisis. The whole-life costs of reservists tend to be far lower than regulars because the average reservist is normally only remunerated for a short number of days per year. However, commanders can be deterred from using them in a crisis because they often represent a new, unbudgeted cost when compared to the sunk cost of a regular. They can also be perceived to be more expensive if called out because of the reservist award, a payment designed to compensate reservists who have had to take a drop in their civilian pay to mobilise.

Second, they appear more expensive to use in support of other government departments. During crises, costs are often waived, but for routine support, marginal costs are usually charged. The marginal costs for using a reservist are usually considerably higher than a regular because regular costs for food, accommodation, etc., are already absorbed. This reduces the attractiveness of sharing reservists' skills and expertise across government and using reservists to complement other departments' resilience plans. Finally, the way budgets are allocated makes it difficult for workforce planners to flex budgets between regular, reserve and civilian workforces.

#### Recommendation

The MOD considers measures to better incentivise the Front Line Commands' use of reserves, including adopting a budgetary strategy that makes it easier for workforce planners to dynamically flex funding between workforce types and enables more reservists to be mobilised each year.

#### Headcount targets

As we move towards 2030 and become more integrated, the distinction between regular and reserve headcount targets will become increasingly arbitrary and will impact Defence's ability to move to a blended workforce model. At a micro level, this will make it difficult to replace regulars or civilians with reservists where it proves more efficient and effective. At a macro level, it will reduce the service chiefs' ability to structure their forces and allocate tasks to those elements most appropriate to deliver them. A more sophisticated model of workforce targets, perhaps connected to capability goals, will be required to maximise the contribution of reservists.



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
### **Recommendation**

Move away from regular and reserve headcount targets, to maximise workforce flexibility across the whole force.

### **Culture**

Our research suggests that, while most regulars now understand the capabilities of reservists, they tend to be less clear about reserve policies and processes. To address this issue would require a cultural change programme. Measures that could help include creating more reserve posts in key headquarters and staff branches, expanding the education of regular officers on reserve issues on staff courses, and incorporating more reservists on regular training exercises and courses. To ensure that tri-service perspectives are represented, the single services should develop enough suitably qualified and experienced reserve personnel to fill joint reserve posts up to 2\* and warrant officers.





## Chapter 4

# Unlocking the potential of reservists





# Chapter 4 – Unlocking the potential of reservists

## Key observations

The evolving character of conflict means that Defence increasingly needs access to cognitive diversity, skills, expertise and networks not held within the regular force.

Accessing these capabilities will require an understanding of the civilian and military attributes of our current reservists and a system to share them across Defence. We will also need mechanisms to access talent outside Defence and to bring them into the enterprise as reservists.

Enabling this will require decentralised, agile workforce management that can recruit at the point of need, in weeks rather than in months. Digital platforms will be needed to track skills and expertise along with a network of headhunters to identify suitable personnel.

Getting the most from this system will require a spectrum of new engagement types that provide a variety of ways to serve, and more flexible ways to join the reserves, including lateral entry and apprenticeships

Most importantly, all this must be underpinned by an appealing offer to attract the necessary talent, retain it and guarantee attendance.

## 4.1 Introduction

Changing threats and the growing importance of technologies developed in the civil sector mean that Defence will increasingly require access to talent that cannot be generated or sustained within the regular workforce.<sup>73,74</sup> Competition for this talent is fierce across the public and private sectors and this will only increase. This chapter describes how Defence

needs to adapt if it is to find, attract and retain these skills, expertise and networks, both from the existing reserve workforce and by recruiting new reservists.

## 4.2 The varying nature of reservists

Reservists are different from regular personnel – they invariably have other attributes from their civilian employment or previous military service. These might be practical skills such as heavy lift drivers, or train operators that are of value to Defence to hold for contingencies. Or, they could be specialist skills that are advancing so rapidly that it is hard for Defence to fully generate or maintain them, for example, cyber or information advantage.<sup>75</sup> They could also have functional skills like complex project management where Defence would benefit from the routine exchanges of ideas. Reservists may also bring with them expertise – deep knowledge of a particular field that takes many years to develop. This could be from industry, academia, or even the military from former service personnel. Aside from skills and expertise, reservists also have access to networks, both from their civilian employment and the communities from which they are drawn. These networks offer opportunities, insights, perspectives, intellectual capacity, knowledge, institutional links, new partnerships and recruits. Importantly they give Defence reach, understanding and influence far beyond the narrow confines of the armed forces.

If Defence is to access these skills, expertise and networks, it first needs to understand the ways reservists differ from their regular counterparts. Most reservists rely on civilian jobs for their primary employment and conduct routine reserve service in their spare time. For others, reserve service can form a significant element within a portfolio career.

<sup>73</sup> In the context of this review, 'skills' refers to a taught ability to conduct a task, while 'expertise' refers to abilities developed through experience and practice in a particular field.

<sup>74</sup> MOD, 'Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued', Cm 8655, July 2013, page 11 and Chief of Defence People, 'Defence People Strategy Part 2: Workforce Strategy draft v2.15', July 2020, page 13.

<sup>75</sup> The RAF reserves optimisation programme aims to expand the RAF's capability in cyber, coding, space, for example.




Figure 4.1 – The varied nature of reservists





### **The Lifer**

A civilian who joins the Royal Naval Reserve as an officer and develops through the ranks in command and staff posts unrelated to civilian work. Commitment varies according to the demands of different civilian career stages.



### **The Shapeshifter**

A sergeant with 10 years of service in the Army Reserve who also has a successful career as the director of a cyber company, and now wants to spend two years in Strategic Command in a cyber post.



### **The Adjuster**

An RAF regular and parent who now wants to spend two years in a spare-time reservist role, before returning to serve full-time in the regular force.



### **The Springer**

A recent graduate who joined the Royal Naval Reserve at university and spent summer periods training with the unit, who now wants to use it as a springboard to regular service.



### **The Apprentice**

A young civilian who wants to become a civilian aircraft technician and accepts a return of service as a reservist in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force in exchange for a military apprenticeship.



### **The Split Personality**

An individual with an engineering degree who works for a defence contractor and is also in the engineering branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. The two employers manage the individual's career in partnership.



### **The Lateral Entrant**

A mid-career cyber specialist who is interested in using these particular skills in an exciting way for the national interest. This specialist enters the Army Reinforcement Reserve at a grade appropriate to subject knowledge and experience.



### **The Ex-Regular**

#### **a The Resilient**

An ex-regular Royal Navy rating who joins the Strategic Reserve.

#### **b The Specialist**

An ex-regular RAF pilot now flying with Airbus for a commercial airline on a variable roster but who is interested in flying spare-time, as part of the RAF Operational Reserve.

#### **c The Sponsored**

An ex-regular lance corporal who left the Army as an HGV driver and joined KBR as a heavy equipment tractor operator, as a sponsored reservist.

#### **d The Consultant**

An ex-regular colonel, experienced in capacity building and stabilisation in the Middle East, joins the Army Reserve to take on a long-term mentoring role of a partner unit, complementing regular activity in the region.

#### **e The Alumnus**

An ex-regular RAF squadron leader who set up a logistics company in Africa 15 years ago, and now wants to give something back to the military by sharing regional knowledge and access to networks through the reserves.



### **The Advisor**

An experienced director of a FTSE 100 company with no military links who wants to offer experience and networks to the armed forces, as an ad-hoc mentor.

Royal Navy	Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve				Royal Fleet Reserve and recall reserve		Sponsored Reserve
	<b>List 1</b> 1 2 3 6 • Split into higher and lower commitments • 24 RSDs per year for bounty	<b>List 2</b> 5 6 FTRS	<b>List 3</b> 6 Unable to commit to Reserves for 1-5 years	<b>List 7</b> 6 • e.g. Cadets, URNU and DTUS • Admin Only	<b>Cyber reserve</b> 1 3 6 Directly recruited for civilian skills	<b>Royal Fleet Reserve</b> 6 • Multiple classes • All ex-regular or reserves with residual liability	
Army	Army Reserve				Regular reserve and recall reserve		Sponsored Reserve
	<b>Group A</b> 1 2 3 4 5 6 19 (national unit) or 27 (regional unit) RSDs per year for bounty	<b>Group B</b> 3 4 6 • Paid or unpaid • Varying RSDs and call out liability • e.g. SGMI, UOTCs	<b>Group D</b> 1 4 6 • Specialist skills • Paid or unpaid • Different medical and physical standards • 19 or 27 RSDs per year for bounty • e.g. General Service Corps	<b>Army Reserve Reinforcement Group (ARRG)</b> 1 4 5 6 • All ranks • ARRG 1 and 2: Retain sponsor unit training liability • ARRG 3 and 4: No training liability • ARRG 5: FTRS	<b>Regular</b> 2 3 4 5 6 <b>Army Reserve of Officers (RARO)</b> Other ranks opting to retain their compulsory commitment past liability	<b>Regular reserve</b> 2 3 4 5 6 Other ranks not serving in regular or reserve • Officers not serving in regular or reserve • Other ranks not serving but under 55	
Royal Air Force	RAF Reserve and recall reserve				RAF Reserve and recall reserve		Sponsored Reserve
	<b>Royal Auxiliary Air Force</b> Predominantly units <b>PTVR</b> 1 2 3 4 6 • 29 squadrons and Joint Cyber unit 27 RSDs per year for bounty Normally up to 90 RSDs (max 180)	<b>Individual augmentees</b> 3 4 5 6 • Gapped regular JPANs • Reserve JPANs	<b>RAF VR</b> 1 6 e.g. UAS and DTUS	<b>Reserve of officers / airmen</b> 6 • Ex-regular officers and airmen with 18-year / age 65 recall commitment • Defined period	<b>Recall reserve</b> 6 • Ex-regular officers and airmen with 18-year / age 65 recall commitment • Not part of RAF reserve	<b>Sponsored Reserve</b> 6 • Contract between contractor and MOD • Part of RAF Reserve	
Terms and conditions of service	5 Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS)				6 Permanent service		Categories including personnel liable for call out
	<b>1 PTVR</b> • Non-binding • Up to 180/207 RSDs with addition of VTOD • Needs CO-assured training for bounty	<b>2 HRR</b> • Specialist volunteer • Increased liability for call out	<b>3 ADC</b> • Binding • Up to 180 RSDs • Alternate or complement to VTOD	<b>4 VeRR</b> • Non-binding • Up to 180 RSDs • Ex-regular • Spare time	<b>Home</b> • Single location • No separation	<b>Limited</b> • Single location • Limited separation	

**Figure 4.2** – The varying language of reserves employment and commitment types (acronyms and initialisms can be found in the glossary)

Reservists usually join to do something different from their ‘day job’, but there are increasingly opportunities to fulfil roles in the reserves that complement their civilian roles. Reservists’ civilian circumstances, and the time they have available for reserve service, will likely change during their career. It is because of all these factors that there is a much wider variation of career profiles for reservists than for regular service personnel. This variation is illustrated in Figure 4.1, along with indicative examples of how reservists currently, and might in the future, serve in the reserves.

These examples illustrate why a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach does not work. A wide range of engagement types and TACOS have developed over time in an attempt to improve access to reserve talent. Figure 4.2 lays these out and demonstrates that, despite some similarities in language, there is limited harmony between single-service TACOS – a consequence of the specific needs of the services, different interpretations of the Reserve Force Act 1996 and the paucity of joint guidance.<sup>76</sup> As a consequence, the policies that were designed to deliver flexibility have created confusion. Our surveys and interviews left us in no doubt that managers lacked understanding of the breadth of engagement types and how to apply different TACOS and were sometimes deterred from using reservists due to the complexity and differences between services.

### 4.3 Simplifying commitment types

There is a need to simplify engagement types into fewer categories with a clearer lexicon.<sup>77,78</sup> While inter-service harmonisation is required to make it easier to share talent across Front Line Commands, we must be careful to ensure that this does not frustrate the services’ ability to meet their individual requirements. Indicative examples of potential categories are shown in Figure 4.3 and as follows:.

- **Permanent** – Full-time commitment enduring (for example) four years or more with part-time and sabbatical options. This partially replaces current longer FTRS, Additional Duties Commitments and regular service.
- **Fixed-term** – Up to (for example) four years full- or part-time. Partially replaces shorter FTRS and Additional Duties Commitments.
- **Commercial** – External third-party contract designed to provide continuity of contracted services primarily in non-benign circumstances. Replaces sponsored reserves.
- **Spare time** – Up to (for example) 180 days per year without mutual obligation. Replaces volunteer reserves.
- **Volunteer** – Unpaid, except for expenses.
- **Retained** – Not routinely employed, but on call. Replaces ex-regular reserve.

Permanent	Fixed-term	Commercial	Spare-time	Volunteer	Retained
More than 4 years, Sabbatical option	Up to 4 years, Full- or part-time	External contract through third party	Up to 180 days per year unless called out	Unpaid except for expenses	Not routinely employed but on call

**Figure 4.3** – Simpler military commitment types

<sup>76</sup> The 2016 Council of RFCAs External Scrutiny Team reported that the rules for the employment of personnel on FTRS and Additional Duties Commitments appeared to be applied very differently between single services, locality and service background and that a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a Whole Force approach to employment. See Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2016, 24 Jun 16, 18.

<sup>77</sup> The current terminology is confusing. For example, ‘volunteer reserve’ is a vestigial 20th century wartime term designed to distinguish between ‘conscripts’ and ‘volunteers’. However, all service personnel are now volunteers and, outside the military, the term is largely associated with unpaid work. Similarly, FTRS personnel are not held ‘in reserve’ and are only termed ‘reservists’ because the engagement is defined by the Reserve Forces Act 1996.

<sup>78</sup> The RAF reserves optimisation programme envisages a continuum of service across regular and reserve engagement types.



## Recommendation


Simplify commitment types across the whole force into fewer categories. Indicative examples may be: permanent, fixed-term, commercial, spare time, volunteer and retained. Redesign the lexicon so it is easily understood by regulars, reservists, employers and civilians.

### 4.4 Creating flexible TACOS

The Australian Defence Force Total Workforce System provides an example of a more flexible and tailored approach to determining TACOS.<sup>79</sup> If this concept were applied to the UK, it could result in a process such as the one described in Figure 4.4.

Applying this to our reserves, the first stage would be to determine the terms of each post, the military requirements and obligations on the post holder. Next, pre-defined rules are applied to provide a degree of consistency across the Front Line Commands. Third, the post owner could then apply for any necessary waivers to accommodate the specifics of the role, ensuring the pool of applicants is not being unnecessarily constrained by policy. These waivers could be held at appropriately tiered levels. The outcome of the second and third stages would be the conditions of service (so, what the armed forces provide to the postholder in return for their service).

The combination of rationalised, easy-to-understand commitment types and the delegated conditions of service would result in a system that would be outwardly simple but sufficiently adaptable to accommodate local nuances and attract the necessary talent.



**Figure 4.4** – Indicative process flow for determining flexible TACOS

79 For example, the Australian Defence Force's Total Workforce System developed under Project SUAKIN.

“...We wonder whether the terms of FTRS and ADC engagement have outgrown their time... applied very differently between Service, locality and service background.”

Council of RFCAs External Scrutiny Team, 2016





## 4.5 Establishing a variable career model

Getting the most out of the above process requires a variable career model that allows reservists to dial up and dial down their commitment, to be able to come in and out of Defence at different stages of their career.

Because there is no standard reservist, easily transferable commitment levels are required to enable Defence to harness their full potential as circumstances evolve during their military and civilian careers. A variable career model needs to include methods for individuals to move between the Strategic, Operational and Reinforcement Reserves. It also needs to incorporate mechanisms that allow Defence to employ reservists with seasonal, part-year or month-on-month-off civilian roles, where it is mutually beneficial to do so.

To make the most of reservists' skills and expertise also requires them to have the ability to switch rank or grade dependent on the post they are fulfilling – for instance, like the 'shapeshifter' example in Figure 4.1. In a similar way, introducing lateral entry could have a transformative effect in enabling Defence to access talent outside of the armed forces and employ them as reservists at a level appropriate with their experience.<sup>80</sup> There may be value in de-linking rank from skill, perhaps via an unranked 'specialist' grade that would allow skilled lateral entrants to be recruited to fill specialist, non-command appointments. 'Specialist' badging could give these individuals credibility within their specialisation while avoiding any misconceptions of their military experience.



<sup>80</sup> Lateral entry is currently available for some specialists, but should become a widespread method where appropriate.



Enabling individuals to shift grade according to role and lateral entry has a number of potential benefits, including improvements to speed of transition, cost and culture. If the necessary processes are put in place, allowing an existing reservist to shift into a role where their civilian skills or expertise are being used should not involve any added training time. Establishing methods to access talent through lateral entry could minimise unnecessary basic training and allow individuals to swiftly enter productive service. Accrediting civilian skills within the military context could speed this up. Costs could be saved by reducing training costs and by reducing the number of consultants that Defence needed to hire.

While the use of civilian contractors may be appropriate in some instances, bringing individuals into the organisation as reservists provides a number of additional benefits:

- It is likely to make those individuals more culturally invested in the organisation and immersed in its values and standards.
- It allows individuals to participate in operations as legal combatants, something that may be of increasing importance in an environment of grey-zone competition.
- It ensures individuals are subject to military law.

### **UK Strategic Command unified career management pilot**

A Strategic Command initiative is currently piloting a unified career management model that allows lateral entry of specialists in service-agnostic domains such as regular cyber and medical staff. If successful, unified career management could be expanded to reserve lateral entry joint specialists to provide greater opportunity for talent to be maximised across the armed forces.

### **Recommendation**

In conjunction with the People Strategy, create a simplified spectrum of service, flexible and harmonised TACOS and a variable career model that allows seamless movement within and outside of Defence.

## **4.6 Agile workforce management**

Creating a simplified spectrum of service, flexible TACOS and variable career model sets the conditions to share talent more effectively. However, this will be of little value unless it is accompanied by a management system that can swiftly find and employ the right people.

The majority of this will continue to take place using existing workforce planning and management systems that establish posts and boards individuals to fill them. However, if we are to fully exploit the skills, expertise and networks of existing reservists, and broader civilian pools of talent, a more dynamic system is required to complement this. One of the central ideas of RF30 is an agile workforce management mechanism that consists of three core elements:

- a search function
- delegated workforce requirements or 'slots' for people to be put into
- hiring managers with delegated authority to adapt the conditions of service to attract the best candidates and employ them in weeks rather than months

This is already being done in a limited way across parts of Defence – however, this is currently happening in spite of the system rather than because of it.



More work is required to understand exactly what the search function should entail, but it is envisaged that it would include a digital platform and a network of Defence recruiters and headhunters to advertise posts and find suitable candidates. This would connect the hiring manager directly to individuals without the need for centralised processes. The result could be a virtual ‘job agency’ (a ‘LinkedIn for Defence’) where willing reservists could voluntarily declare their civilian expertise.<sup>81</sup>

Among other uses, this would create a short-term jobs market to advertise both in and outside of Defence. This could include niche activities such as specialist projects, defence engagement and innovative business management – as well as routine activities such as general support, exercises, and courts martial. The Reinforcement Reserve could form an internal pool of talent, including individuals who are between engagements, to fulfil these commitments.<sup>82</sup> The result would be a repository of skilled, willing and available reservists whose individual abilities are widely understood and who could be offered

opportunities. This pool could extend beyond the Reinforcement Reserve to include all reservists, and more widely outside the armed forces. Importantly, all the services would be able to offer any member of the Reinforcement Reserve work opportunities, maximising the access to talent.

Strategic Command’s Joint Warfare Augmentation Cadre (JWAC) re-allocates funds from gapped regular posts to fund short-term, part-time project support, using reservists from any service. JWAC use a civilian headhunting network of contacts, and advertise via the SERVE recruiting platform. The regular force takes time to identify each position’s specific requirements, then integrates the individual reservists into the regular teams, bringing in a mix of ex-regular and specialist skills.

81 Much of the necessary functionality may be delivered by current systems, such as an enhanced Defence Connect extranet and the MOD’s SERVE jobs website. SERVE’s commercial software has features yet to be enabled: It is designed to cover most aspects from advertising to ‘onboarding’. The SERVE website is at [www.findforcesjobs.mod.gov.uk](http://www.findforcesjobs.mod.gov.uk).

82 The RAF’s reserves optimisation programme envisages an unposted list of reservists. The Army is further developing the utility and flexibility of its existing reinforcement group (ARRG).

Front Line Commands would retain control of this process by determining how much headcount would be delegated and to what level, as well as setting the policy boundaries for the criteria under which people could be employed. Different levels of delegations would be held at different levels to set rank, grade, pay, commitment, training requirements, medical standards and so on. This would allow hiring at the point of need in a much more tailored, nuanced and responsive way. This flexible approach to personnel hiring is key to maximising the potential of reservists, but it may take time to refine.

### Recommendation

Develop an agile workforce management function to find, recruit and bring skills, expertise and networks to the point of need.

## 4.7 Using civilian skills

Trying to make greater use of civilian skills through reservists is not a new concept. FR20 recognised that many skills can be generated or sustained better in the civilian world. In 2013, the FR20 External Scrutiny Team identified that reservists' civilian skills and qualifications could be invaluable in making more extensive and intelligent use of personnel, but that the armed forces did not hold comprehensive data. It recommended the swift introduction of a management information system to capture, among other things, reservist skillsets.<sup>83</sup> While some progress has been made, this has been largely restricted to single-service silos.<sup>84</sup> In 2019, additional functionality was added to Defence's HR IT platform, JPA, to allow externally-acquired knowledge, skills and experience to be taken into account when determining future appointments. However, this is only accessible by line and career managers.<sup>85</sup> Other than professionally qualified officers (such as doctors and dentists) and specialists such as cyber, our surveys suggest that reservists' civilian skills are currently only used on a coincidental basis, rather than by design. Despite some local unit databases, the armed forces also have little knowledge of reservists' abilities beyond their military competencies. This was a clear frustration to commanders during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic and seen as a missed opportunity.<sup>86</sup>

83 Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations, 'Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Group 2013 Report', CRFA/532/5, 12 June 2013, pages 3, 9, and 18.

84 The Army is developing a MyArmy app, along with the 'SKiL' personal skills logging function, while the Royal Navy and RAF are adopting MyNavy and MyRAF. The recently launched SERVE system has some skills database capability.

85 MOD, 'Defence Internal Brief 2019DIB/03 – Recording External Knowledge, Skills and Experience on JPA', 8 February 2019. The function is intended to record activities such as voluntary work, external study or other skills acquired outside the service environment.

86 Lt Gen Urch, as above.



During a chance meeting in 2015, an RAF reservist (who was an airline manager) was asked to give advice about aviation fuel management to the RAF Air Mobility Force. The reservist subsequently used their commercial knowledge to develop a change programme, recruiting and training a team who saved £4 million in the first year and £8 million in the second.

Making greater use of civilian skills also depends on reservists' willingness to use them. The reserves continuous attitude surveys have consistently indicated that about 50% of reservists join to 'do something different', which is often used to imply that there is limited enthusiasm to use civilian skills. However, these surveys also show that only 40% see 'doing something different' as a reason for remaining in the reserves, with camaraderie becoming increasingly important as time moves on. In addition, the percentage of reservists using their civilian skills during their military activities has increased from about 60% to 70% since 2014.<sup>87</sup> A Defence Academy survey of the Maritime Reserve indicated that 93% were prepared to use their civilian skills in the military in the future.<sup>88</sup> So it may be that, while reservists initially join to do something different, they become increasingly prepared to use their civilian skills as their military careers develop. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, both the reservist and their employer potentially benefit from developing their civilian skills in the wider context of defence. The chapter also made clear that any increased demand on reservists would have to be matched with an improved offer.

## 4.8 The reserves offer

Figure 4.5 illustrates the reserves offer. It blends tangible and intangible, financial and non-financial components and is perceived differently based on individuals' continually changing circumstances. The four themes of rewards, opportunities, environment and motivators make up the 'lived experience' – the totality of an individual's direct experience of reserve service. A good lived experience should help attract and retain the necessary talent.

Reserve service offers the potential to gain new skills and experience, something which is particularly attractive for people keen to attain new skills. Volunteers want to make a difference but also to have fun at the same time. With so many voluntary organisations around, the reserves need to stand out and make joining easy. A recent Army Reserve survey has indicated that a sense of belonging, meeting people and being a part of a team are key motivators, especially for women.<sup>89</sup> The recruitment of individuals with diverse skills, perspectives, beliefs and backgrounds brings strength and richness to our organisation and helps the armed forces reflect the society it exists to defend. The diversity of reservists also helps attract external specialists who might otherwise not be predisposed to engage with us.

87 MOD, 'Tri-service Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey', 2014 to 2019.

88 MacKenzie, Cdr H, as above.

89 Nick Terry, 'Army Reserve Key Research Findings', January 2020.



**Figure 4.5** – Elements of the reserves offer and lived experience, based on a model in the Defence People Strategy

## 4.9 Widening access to talent

Creating flexible TACOS, establishing a variable career model, and introducing agile workforce management will all materially improve Defence’s access to skills, expertise and networks through the reserves. However, attracting and retaining talent will also require improvements to remuneration, recruitment incentive, medical entry standards and age limits.

Some single services are aligning the regular and reservist recruitment process, a theme that the Armed Forces Recruitment Programme will advance.<sup>90</sup> The review recommends that this be expanded to appropriate forms of reserve service, as the distinction between the regulars and reserves becomes increasingly irrelevant. For this to be effective, recruitment processes would need to account for the nuances

of reserve service, such as the diversity of applicants, and that reservists are considered as a core recruitment requirement, rather than assimilated. Reserve recruitment also benefits from being pitched both nationally and locally. Almost all reserve units will need qualified recruiters who understand the character of their unit and its offer to, and demands of, recruits.

### 4.9.1 Remuneration

The 2018 Future Reserves Research Programme concluded that reservist civilian skills were “under-recognised, under-rewarded and potentially under-utilised”.<sup>91</sup> Where reservists are employed for their civilian skills, there needs to be a way of remunerating them according to the value of the skill, rather than their reservist rank.

<sup>90</sup> For example, the RAuxAF’s ‘common candidate journey’ for part-time volunteer reserves.

<sup>91</sup> Future Reserves Research Programme, ‘Keeping Enough in Reserve: The employment of hybrid citizen-soldiers and the Future Reserves 2020 programme’, project briefing 2, June 2018.

Defence must foster a more open-minded approach as even the most junior reservist may have a skilled professional background.<sup>92</sup> It must also be careful not to use agile workforce management as a way to secure sought-after civilian skills on the cheap.<sup>93</sup> Rather, it should recognise the value of being able to access civilian skills through individuals who buy into and understand the language of defence. When reservists are used for civilian roles unrelated to their military skills, they could be treated as unranked specialists and paid a daily rate appropriate to their expertise rather than their reserve military rank.

#### **4.9.2 Increasing commitment levels through education and training incentives**

The need to improve commitment levels from reservists is a key deduction of this review. As highlighted by the US reserve model, one of the most effective ways this could be achieved would be by funding reservists through further education or apprenticeship programmes in exchange for periods of guaranteed service. Clearly, such an ambitious initiative would first need to be tested by a comprehensive balance of investment study. In advance of this work, ideas that explore the concept are described below.

University was traditionally seen as an officer recruiting pool, but with about 50% of UK school leavers now attending university it has increasingly also become a source of non-commissioned recruits. Graduates are a more important recruiting pool for the reserves than for the regular forces: many may have career ambitions outside the military, but they have spare time and therefore remain potential reservists.

Our surveys showed that a proposition to reduce the debt of student fees in exchange for a return of service in the reserves after graduation would be the most significant incentive for students to join and remain committed.<sup>94</sup> This should be open to all, but the amount of award might be tailored according to how valuable the graduate's skill is to Defence. The amount would have to be significantly attractive, as many students see the debt as a tax that they do not have to start repaying until their earnings reach a certain level.<sup>95</sup> There is also benefit in university service units providing opportunities for undergraduates to undertake reserve initial training during their vacations, which would accelerate their entry into productive reserve service. The use of qualified recruiters could be expanded across all university service units.



<sup>92</sup> One RAuxAF corporal is the director of a space launch company, for example.

<sup>93</sup> Our survey revealed an unrealistic case where Defence tried to secure the expertise of a RAuxAF senior aircraftsman (OR2) with a satellite technology background for a six-month project on Reserve Service Days at their OR2 daily rate.

<sup>94</sup> This view was reflected in a broad range of our review's engagements, including the RF30 Early Career Event, 26 August 2020.

<sup>95</sup> Currently £26,575 per year.



We should consider awarding graduates an annual payment towards their student fee loans in return for satisfactory reserve service.

The Army currently offers a limited number of 6 to 18-month officer internships for university students before, during or after their degrees. There is benefit to widening the scope of placements across the armed forces in return for a commitment to reserve service.

Building on the themes in Chapter 2, it is also worth considering partnering with defence-related industry for third-year university placements. Undergraduate industry placements are commonplace for certain degrees. Partnering with industry would share the financial burden while upskilling the student with joint military/civilian knowledge, skills and experience. It would also reinforce their degree with broad practical experience. Industry could be incentivised by sharing the cost with Defence and potentially finding high-grade graduates for subsequent employment. Partnering from the outset would strengthen the relationship between Defence and industry.

Apprenticeships could be a way to generate skilled reservists through partnership with defence-related industries.<sup>96</sup> Although multi-employer apprenticeships are currently not allowed under Education and Skills Funding Agency regulations, they are being increasingly discussed by industry as a potential solution to regional skill deficiencies while spreading the cost burden of employing apprentices. The result could be an upskilled school leaver with a full-time job in a defence-related industry with a reserve service liability. Alternatively, a reservist apprentice could complete a year or two of full-time service before transferring to

a reserve commitment (as already happens in some of our allies' armed forces). Reservists are currently ineligible for apprenticeships due to the government requirement to be in full-time employment. However, the impact of COVID-19 has renewed the government's interest in widening the scope of apprenticeships, so there is value in negotiating with the Department for Education to relax this condition.<sup>97</sup>

Ex-regulars are another rich source of talent and a key component of the RF30. Our surveys indicated that they are not well briefed on the range of reserve service options open to them when they leave the regular force, particularly their residual call-out and recall liabilities. Defence needs to change the narrative. For most, the resettlement process should be seen as a transfer to some form of reserve service, whether that be the Reinforcement Reserve, Operational Reserve or Strategic Reserve, albeit with different forms of commitment. The term 'service leaver' should only be applied to those who have no recall or call-out liability. As an incentive to join the Reinforcement or Operational Reserves, there is value in considering a reduction in the minimum waiting time associated with regulars who request early termination. Our surveys indicated that attempts by ex-regulars to join the reserves are hindered by unnecessary processes. There is merit in further extending the 'seamless transfer' window to reduce hurdles to recruitment.

### 4.9.3 Medical entry standards

To access a wider talent pool, the medical standards for reservists need to be more closely aligned to their job roles. Current reserve forces' medical entry standards are aligned with tri-service regular standards.<sup>98</sup> In exceptional circumstances, candidates who are found to be medically unfit may enter service through a single-service executive/personnel 'waiver'.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> The wider aspects of burden-sharing with industry are examined in Chapter 3.

<sup>97</sup> Department of Education regulations require apprentices to be in full-time work (a minimum of 30 hours per week, or 16 hours in exceptional cases) for the duration of the apprenticeship (which must last at least 12 months). See also JSP822, section 6.3, paragraph 8b.

<sup>98</sup> The universal entry Joint Medical Employment Standard is currently set to ensure that a service person can, throughout their engagement, deploy anywhere in the world at short notice, in locations remote from established medical care. In these locations they must be able to undergo regular and substantial levels of exercise, such as running 30 to 40 minutes at least 3 times a week and hill walking with a 10kg backpack for 90 to 120 minutes a week (see JSP950 leaflet 6-7-7, pages 4-1 and 3-1).

<sup>99</sup> See JSP950 Leaflet 6-7-7, page 4-2, paragraph 7b.

Some single services also set employment-based group waivers to allow different medical standards for some trades.

The FR20 External Scrutiny Team recommended that medical entry standards be reviewed to ensure they were not unduly prescriptive for reservists, especially those in less physically demanding roles. The MOD acknowledged the need for relaxation for some specialist and niche roles, but preferred to manage these potential reservists through individual waivers.<sup>100</sup> Nonetheless, we received several comments from candidates (including a champion athlete) who had been declared unfit and were unaware of the waiver system. While the list of medical conditions that preclude entry is published on the internet, the existence of the waiver system is not – and our survey provided evidence that this has discouraged people from applying. The waiver staffing process (which can involve individual risk assessments) normally requires a service sponsor and can be a lengthy, resource-heavy procedure. Reserve units have complained that recruiting organisations have insufficient capacity to process waiver bids.<sup>101</sup>

It is clear to us that medical entry standards should be adapted to avoid excluding talent (especially among specialists).<sup>102</sup> There is merit in developing Career Employment Group Standards for both reserve and regular personnel that would assign appropriate medical entry standards to each employment group based on their roles and minimise the use of the waiver system. Although the entry standard is set by the Medical Employment Standards Military Judgement Panel, the capability requirement would need to be determined by the Military People Leadership Team.<sup>103</sup>

#### 4.9.4 Age limits

The age profile of the UK labour workforce will shift markedly in the next decade – one-third of all workers will be over 50 years old by 2030. The military workforce currently has a variety of upper age limits for joining and retirement. Some retirement extensions are available, but our surveys illustrate that these are often in one-year increments and generate both uncertainty for the individual and recurrent bureaucratic processes.

The disparity between commissioned and non-commissioned age limits is also likely to seem increasingly unacceptable. Older workers bring a strong work ethic, reliability, loyalty, business experience, institutional memory and specialised skills.<sup>104</sup> There is a clear requirement to maintain fitness for role, but implementation of the IOpC 25 could provide increasing opportunities to retain and use the skills and expertise of older service people, particularly within the Reinforcement Reserve. To make this possible, Defence will need to re-examine age limits for both recruitment and termination throughout the armed forces to maximise access to talent. This will require careful workforce planning and management.

#### Recommendation

Further develop reserves recruiting to integrate with regular recruiting where appropriate and to improve access to the talent and diversity required to match the evolving characteristics of conflict.


100 Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations, 'UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2016', 24 June 2016, page 10.

101 Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations, 'UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2016', 24 June 2016, page 10.

102 As early as 2013, the FR20 External Scrutiny Team commented that "Defence capabilities could be considerably enhanced by utilising reach-back through non-deployable reservists, recruited not because of their generic military utility but much more through harnessing their specific civilian/professional skills for military purpose". See the Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations, 'Future Reserves 2020 External Scrutiny Team 2013 Report', CRFA/532/5, 12 June 2013, page 11.

103 The MESMJP set the medical standards and report to the medical policy steering group and the injury prevention steering group. However, the Military People Leadership Team should be ultimately responsible for setting the physical requirement from which medical standards are derived.

104 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 'An Ageing Workforce', Postnote 391, October 2011.

A person wearing a white protective suit, hood, and glasses is working in a laboratory. They are using a pipette to transfer liquid into a multi-well plate. The background shows other laboratory equipment and a person in a similar suit.

## Chapter 5

### Transforming support to the reserves





# Chapter 5 – Transforming support to the reserves

## Key observations

The reserve forces require an organisation to deliver functions not currently provided by the single services, particularly enabling the Reinforcement Reserve and managing the Strategic Reserve. The establishment of a Reserves Support Organisation would be the most efficient approach but it must complement and enhance, rather than replace, the capabilities of the Front Line Commands.

Delivery of the RF30 vision must be underpinned by digitisation. It should:

- enable reservists to work and communicate with both their regular and reserve colleagues remotely
- provide new technology, such as simulation, a synthetic environment and augmented reality to improve training
- provide holistic data analytics to reliably assess and track assured readiness

Many of these initiatives are already being developed, but we need to ensure that they consider reservists' needs from the outset, rather than them being an adjunct.

RF30 supports the MOD's strategic intent for training design to become more role-focused and adaptable, offering choice for different types of candidate.

The reserves estate, correctly sited, can become a more useful asset, especially in support of UK resilience and mobilisation. There is also potential to develop it as a network of hubs to engage, partner and recruit across society.

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the use of virtual networking to enhance unit activities and support communities of interest. The reserve forces could be at the forefront of developing and exploiting virtual hubs and networks within Defence.

Legislation for call-out is effective and is being used more broadly since FR20. However, the process is not well understood by most internal and external stakeholders. Gains can be made by streamlining readiness and mobilisation procedures.

## 5.1 Introduction

Reservists have different support needs to regulars. Many perform their routine military duties outside core working hours, their attendance is normally episodic and they lack routine access to core MOD facilities. If they are to provide greater utility, then the support they receive will have to be better tailored to their needs. This chapter explores the key areas where support to the reserves need be enhanced to improve their operational efficiency and effectiveness.

## 5.2 Reserves Support Organisation

The reserves framework introduced in Chapter 2 will require the establishment of new support capabilities to enable the Reinforcement Reserve, strengthen the Operational Reserve and revitalise a credible Strategic Reserve. These functions could be done within each single service, but we believe that a better option would be to establish a Reserves Support Organisation (RSO).

This would ensure that the unique support requirements of reservists are addressed persistently by a strong champion. It could also generate synergies between the various elements of reserve support functions and economies of scale. In designing the RSO, it would be important to ensure that it complements the support functions already delivered by the Front Line Commands and promotes regular-reserve integration. The MOD should consider how and if these functions could be delivered as part of newly structured Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations. This is because they:

- already run other elements of unique support to the reserves, such as employer engagement and estate management
- know how to bridge the military-civil divide
- have a well-established presence in every region of the UK

Possible functions to be delivered by a Reserves Support Organisation include:

- engage the Strategic Reserve – this would require a marketing and management capability that engages with members of the armed forces who have completed regular or reserve service
- enable the Reinforcement Reserve – this involves enabling a talent pool of reservists who wish to apply for individual tasks in support of the routine operation of Defence, ideally in posts in any of the Front Line Commands, irrespective of the reservist's parent service (where feasible)
  - the talent search function would need to be dovetailed into existing people transformation and digital optimisation workstreams
- support mass call-out and mobilisation – supporting the re-establishment of a capability to conduct reserves call-out at scale and pace, including a pattern of mobilisation exercises

- manage resilience volunteers – supporting a capability to manage additional, non-uniformed, ex-regular personnel and former reservists as volunteers to support UK resilience activities in a crisis

### Recommendation

Explore the need for an RSO to support the unique requirements of reservists. The MOD should consider how and if these functions could be delivered within newly structured Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations.\*

\*Functions strictly limited to areas not currently undertaken within the services. Must promote regular / reserve integration.

## 5.3 Digitisation and technology

### 5.3.1 Overview

Digitisation will be fundamental to the delivery of not only the RF30 vision but also the IOpC 25. If Defence places more reliance on the delivery of contingent capability through its reserves, then reservists will require access to modern synthetic training solutions. These will enable the development of collective capability across networked systems and ensure that reservists retain currency in specialist skills.

Commanders at all levels will require analytic tools to help assure the capability and readiness of units in the Operational Reserve. The Reinforcement Reserve will only be effective if it has a digital platform that enables access to a broad array of talent. Digital solutions will also be required to link up communities of interest, where the reserves can bring to bear subject expertise and diversity of thought. Digital is a theme that runs throughout this chapter.



## Recommendation

Exploit digitisation, technology and networks to improve recruiting, enrich the offer and connect the reserves with the whole force.

### 5.3.2 Access to digital services and information

MODNET is Defence's primary internal communication and collaboration IT platform at the 'official sensitive' level, but it is only accessible via specific devices. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for all employees to be able to work remotely and collaboratively, something that was already apparent to reservists. Despite a marked increase in the provision of remote MODNET access, many reservists remain disconnected. Even once connected to MODNET, it is not easy to connect with people and information – the system simply is not intuitive enough for the occasional user.

A recent Defence Digital Services review identified the need to reform working practices and align digital services to global best-in-class standards.<sup>105</sup> Many civilian companies focus their IT infrastructure efforts on their dispersed workforce, but within Defence, remote employees such as reservists remain on the fringes. There is some provision for access to information via Defence Connect through the Defence Gateway up to 'official' level, but this is neither intended nor configured to mirror MODNET's level of functionality.

"IT infrastructure restricts effective collaboration with both internal colleagues and external partners or suppliers... users [have] difficulty in finding information."

#### Defence Digital Services

There are a number of efforts underway to make information more accessible and intuitive to find. The 'digital optimisation' programme promotes reserve-specific solutions that are now being progressed in a whole-force context by Defence Digital Services.<sup>106</sup> The single services are producing individual technical solutions that may be accessed on personal devices.<sup>107</sup>

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has connected its entire workforce. ForceNet is a single secure portal, available via a smartphone app. It serves regulars, reservists, veterans and families. Popular and intuitive, it has helped integrate the workforce, particularly through its use of communities of interest (such as units, professional groups, base forums). ForceNet links to – and complements – the ADF equivalent of MODNET, which is also available over the internet for many staff. ForceNet can be used as a command tool and has a wide range of functionality, including personal administration, job applications, skills tracking and personal availability for reserve duty.

## 5.4 Optimising training

### 5.4.1 Overview

The FR20 Commission recommended that, to improve the reserves proposition, Defence should 'rebuild' individual officer and soldier training, incorporating online/blended training.<sup>108</sup> It also recommended improvements to collective training, with the Army Reserve in particular enabled to exercise and deploy at unit and sub-unit level. It suggested that command training should be enhanced, with a view to increasing command opportunities, in training and on deployment.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Defence Digital Services, 'Digital playbook report', 2020.

<sup>106</sup> For example, the reserves attendance and pay services, launched in 2017, is available online on Defence Connect.

<sup>107</sup> For example, MyNavy, MyArmy and MyRAF.

<sup>108</sup> For simplicity and brevity, in this section we refer to 'training' as including both military training and education, the approach used in Joint Services Publication JSP 822.

<sup>109</sup> MOD, 'Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces', July 2011, pages 7 and 33.

Defence continues to develop these recommendations, all of which remain fundamental to RF30. However, the review believes Defence needs to go further if the ambition outlined in the IOpC 25 is to be realised. How we train our people will be critical to maintaining an intellectual and conceptual edge. Defence has recognised that this will require training to be more focused and adaptable, and for personal skills to be tracked and accredited. As a result, there will be fewer instances of training everyone to do everything ‘just in case’. Core training – delivered in modular form – will be supplemented as required at the point of need, saving time and money, and importantly minimising skill fade. This approach will create flexibility to adapt and reskill all armed forces personnel where needed, at any time in their careers. This will be transformative for the reserves and has the potential to greatly improve whole-force integration. For instance, reserve residential training has often been constructed as an afterthought to regular ‘full course’ design. By 2030, we expect the distinction to become blurred, with courses routinely designed with adaptable syllabuses in modular form, focused on what is genuinely needed and deliverable in a variety of ways, to suit different types of candidate.

“Training will increasingly be offered through alternative delivery methods, including technology-enabled learning ... increasing access and flexibility.”

#### **Defence People Strategy**

### **5.4.2 Individual training**

Modular<sup>110</sup> design from the outset will allow individual training and education to be more tailored to each service person’s role requirement. Offering modules and individual choice as to when, how and where to undertake



training will enable Defence to recruit and retain a richer pool of reservists: not only more time-poor individuals but also those with valuable skills we need to compete for.

“Traditional residential programmes will remain valid for some, but shorter interventions will increasingly be needed. They must be accessible at different times in a career and support personalised learning journeys.”

#### **Defence Academy**

Reserves training options will need to strike a balance between centralised and decentralised activity. The national footprint of reserves units and basing will also have a role to play in delivering localised, accessible modules of training to individuals, shared with other units and across the services, where possible. The use of fixed-term full-time engagements to allow reserves’ attendance on longer Defence courses could be expanded.

<sup>110</sup> Modularity is a term used here in a generic sense to indicate componency. Succinct definitions will be forthcoming as TESRR reviews its lexicon, but a ‘module’ might be a formed component of an accredited course, a ‘micro-module’ might be a subset deliverable on its own as ‘just-in-time’ training, and an ‘artefact’ might be a standalone piece of learning.

### 5.4.3 Collective training

Integration of regulars and reserves for collective training remains uncommon and challenging, although examples such as the Maritime Reserves' participation in Exercise Joint Warrior do exist. Reserve units can often be found conducting similar but separate training, lacking mass and co-ordination, and without regular participation. The different working hours of regulars and reservists is a perennial problem, not helped by taut and inflexible training resources. This can only be partly mitigated through more predictability of events and reserve-friendly scheduling.

By 2030, technology could provide virtual collective training, to connect regulars and reservists separated by geography and the timing of availability – but there is still an issue of duration. Many regular-led exercises are necessarily longer than the standard two-week reserves annual training window. Reserves attending a two-week portion of an exercise can be mutually beneficial, but, if they were to join for a longer period every few years, this would certainly build collective capability further.

A method exists to allow mobilisation to train for longer periods under the policy for Defence Activities Other Than Operations (DAOTO).<sup>111</sup> DAOTO can be applied across defence outputs, judged on a case-by-case basis. For training outputs, the current policy is somewhat prescriptive in stating it should be used for headline exercises or defence engagement-related events, but not more routine training activity. This depends on how one defines 'routine'. If we are to place greater reliance on the reserves to provide contingent capability, there will be merits in developing upon DAOTO – or other TACOS methods – to allow mobilisation for training that may be routine but is also essential.

### 5.4.4 Initial training

Initial training is a formative part of the 'lived experience' for direct entry reserves recruits and, because of this, it bears particular scrutiny. Having reserves and regulars undergo aspects of this training together has attractions in terms of fostering mutual understanding and establishing an assured quality baseline. We see this working in the US, although the cultural context there is very different to the UK. US Army National Guard candidates are required to attend the same 11-week residential course as their regular counterparts. In Australia, initial training in the Army Reserve is 35 days long and is again delivered as an unbroken residential course, but reservists train in separate platoons. This initial training is deemed to be 'federally protected service'.

US National Guard recruits integrate with regulars for initial and trade training, unifying output and helping bind the force. Employers are generally supportive of employees 'mobilising to train'.

In the UK, there are already options in the Army Reserve to undergo consolidated basic training – for example on relatively short 'summer challenge' courses. We believe this approach could be expanded in some instances where there is a logical requirement.

In contrast, the RAF's reserve optimisation programme aims to minimise the initial training of technical individual augmentees to shorten the training pipeline. While not appropriate for all direct-entry reservists across the services, consideration should be given to options for reservists to attend multiple modules of initial training together with regular colleagues, whether consolidated or otherwise.<sup>112</sup> Longer residential options could be unlocked – as in other countries – if civilian employers

<sup>111</sup> Defence People: Reserve Forces and Cadets, 'The Use of Reserves on Defence Activity other than Operations', 2019DIN03-017, August 2019.

<sup>112</sup> For the Army Reserve especially, this should be balanced against a logical and attractive requirement for the reserves to be able to train themselves to a reasonable degree (a capability in its own right). The current Army initial training solution makes pragmatic use of both regular and reserves establishments and talent.



were suitably incentivised and if reservists could have employment protections while under initial training, perhaps via DAOTO.

#### 5.4.5 Digitisation and technology in training

FR20 recommended that Defence should deliver “improved individual training and education via the internet, simulation and synthetic environments”. While movement has been slow in this area, momentum is beginning to pick up. The Defence Learning and Management Capability (DLMC) initiative will reset how Defence designs and manages training and education. Its aim is to improve the learning experience for all employees, supported by the principles of modularity and ease of access and its focus is on improving and cohering digital learning services. DLMC aims to enable digital training content to become easier to find and interlinked across the armed forces. This is positive news for the training and education of reserves, potentially encouraging more engagement, including self-directed study. Prioritising reservists’ requirements in the DLMC programme could have a positive effect in enhancing their capabilities.

During the 2020 lockdown, the Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry sought to use a virtual training system to keep personnel engaged. They forged ahead using open-source solutions until guided to an in-service licensed solution, not well known to the reserves or habitually used by them. Some excellent training was delivered remotely, enabled online.

Plans are also in motion within Defence to enhance its provision of simulation and synthetics, which will significantly enhance capability development through adaptable



collective and individual training.<sup>113,114</sup> This is not just to introduce realism, but is also about delivering productive experiential learning with associated cost-effectiveness.<sup>115</sup> These advances will allow reservists to conduct virtual training on platforms and equipment within immersive, realistic and collaborative scenarios. Synthetics could energise local training, with scope to substantially modernise the lived experience at traditional reserve centres, and can even energise self-directed learning at home for generations brought up with gaming. Consideration should be given to prioritising reservists in the roll-out of these technologies – not only because they would see a step change in reserve capability, but also because they would be highly effective in recruiting and retaining reservists who normally have restricted access to mainstream training resources.

#### 5.4.6 The reserves as a training resource

As Defence reconfigures to compete in an era of multi-domain integration, the intellectual demand on its people will only increase and corresponding training needs will become yet

<sup>113</sup> Co-ordinated plans, exemplified by the Strategic Command-led issue of JSP 939. MOD, ‘Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation’, JSP 939, v2.0, April 2020.

<sup>114</sup> Director Capability Army speaks of future synthetic training having the potential for “turning collective training into mission training” (through its realism, adaptability, and so on). General Staff update, 12 November 2020.

<sup>115</sup> The Defence Simulation Centre describes the application of modelling and simulation as effecting ‘brain training’ rather than ‘muscle training’, where trainees learn to ‘fight’ systems, reducing the need for unnecessary fidelity.

more technical and complex. The reserves could help Defence meet such burgeoning training demands, especially by using retained talent and ‘professionalising’ training support. This would benefit the whole force.

Many routine programmed training events should rightly continue to be delivered in-house, developing organic unit training capability as well the trainees themselves. However, more novel approaches could be applied for events that may be too complex to deliver from scratch on an ad-hoc basis: events that take time to plan and may ultimately disrupt core unit business. There is scope to use the Reinforcement Reserve pool, together with the sponsored reserves model to enhance training support. Defence could draw on ex-regular and other specialist trainer talent to help deliver events at all levels, from localised individual training, to collective training, to training for operations (for example, technical training in ships).

In terms of sponsored reserves, some training could be contracted to private sector firms to deliver, with the expectation that they could offer efficiencies and continuity, while freeing up capacity within the armed forces. There is an opportunity to professionalise a cadre of trainers who understand the training audience. The sponsored reserves model would mean that the trainers could be mobilised in times of crisis and have their remit expanded, for example, to support mission-specific training for the regular force, increase the capacity of the Operational Reserve, or to start regenerating the Strategic Reserve.

#### **5.4.7 Building accreditation**

Chapter 4 highlighted the need to capture reservists’ civilian skills within the military context to avoid unnecessary retraining. Improvements have been made since FR20, but our consultations with employers and reservists revealed that recognition of national licences and qualifications remains limited. The accrediting of civilian training and licences is essential in facilitating lateral entry and unlocking the potential of the Reinforcement Reserve. It may prove worthwhile to open more military

courses and extend the scope of the MOD’s Enhanced Learning Credits scheme, which supports the costs of civilian courses for service personnel. Enhanced Learning Credit incentives would aid retention and (if linked to the annual certificate of efficiency) attendance.

#### **Recommendation**


Design training and education so that it can be tailored to the role, availability and diverse needs of the reservist, providing greater choice and flexibility.

### **5.5 Basing, hubs and networks**

#### **5.5.1 Integrated by design**

By 2030, RF30 envisions that reserve centres will be seen as virtual as well as physical hubs. Their locations will be optimised to add additional value as a dispersed national network of hubs, and they will be geared among other functions to interface with public sector agencies as part of an integrated resilience effort.

The reserve estate could also offer greater shared use by civilian partners, supporting the core aim of developing the military’s connection with society. Figure 5.1 illustrates this vision with reserves centres geared to provide multiple defence outputs, in addition to their traditional role of hosting reserve units, while exploiting latent capacity by sharing use with other parties. Figure 5.2 lists examples of outputs that might be developed by reserve centre hubs – military, cross-agency and commercial. Of course, not all centres will be suitable for all such outputs but the principle of greater coherence could apply everywhere. In addition it will be important to recognise the needs of cadets where they share the use of reserve infrastructure.



**Figure 5.1** – Conceptual example of a reserves centre as a hub



Functions	Outputs
Hub	An overarching function co-ordinating local defence outputs.
Single-service lead user	A home and hub for a reserve sub-unit.
Single-service detachments	A home for other reserve elements.
Regular single services	A home also for regular elements, where appropriate.
Strategic Reserve	A hub for engagement, occasional refresher training and administration across the armed forces. A particular point of focus for local members of the Strategic Reserve. A local point for kit exchange.
Generic MOD business support	A drop-in centre for any MOD users to conduct administration (including Strategic Reserves and veterans).
Specialist and virtual communities	A physical home base or hub for specialist communities of interest (e.g. innovation or academic hubs) where there is a geographical centre of gravity.
Readiness, muster and mobilisation	Supporting both routine preparedness and contributing to force generation at scale and pace. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the advantages of localised mobilisation, especially when travel is restricted (a situation that could also occur during local or major crises).
Training and simulation	A shared resource for collaborative distributed training, not just for resident reservists but also for other local or visiting agencies, promoting the MOD as a local 'training facilitator of choice', with associated reputational benefit.
Resilience support	A hub for local resilience integration, including planning, training and the conduct of operations. Suitable sites could help bolster the existing Joint Regional Liaison Officer capability, hosting liaison cells, and building relationships with local agencies.
Logistic support	A local Defence logistics distribution and storage site. Potentially joint venturing with a civilian logistics business (option for income generation).
Careers and opportunities	A local tri-service recruiting and jobs centre for all commitment types (including ex-regulars, military families).
Armed Forces Covenant and employer engagement	A hub for next-level Defence Relationship Management activity (e.g. engagement with employers, veterans, widening the Employer Recognition Scheme).
Public sector shared use	A shared resource for blue light services and local government agencies (meetings, team training etc). Option for income generation.
Private sector shared use	Ad-hoc hiring or formal joint venturing with business (WeWork-style offices, gym facilities etc). Income generation.

**Figure 5.2** – Illustration of outputs that might be developed by a reserve centre as a hub

### 5.5.2 The physical estate

The reserves basing estate is currently undergoing a capability-led review of its footprint. Many reserve units are based 'outside the wire', close to population centres to promote local recruiting, attendance and community engagement.

Many reserve centres serve only one service and can be underused. We believe there is potential to configure them for wider military and communal use for operational, networking, engagement and financial benefit by building on lessons learnt at sites that are already successfully sharing facilities with both the public and private sectors. Despite efficiency drives towards centralisation, reserve centres play a vital role in reaching out into the regions, connecting with society and widening recruit diversity.

The footprint is more than just the sum of its geography and should be leveraged to deliver coherent, tailored and localised operational and business outputs and as a conduit to better engage with society.

Latent capacity at reserve sites could be offered to other public sector users in keeping with the national 'One Public Estate' initiative. Defence could offer shared use to the blue light services, NHS and other local public sector bodies. Making reserve centres more public-facing would help promote understanding and visibility of the armed forces and could strengthen recruiting. There is also scope for more engagement and sharing with the private sector.

The Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations' Alternative Venues scheme, run as an additional task by unit staff, is proving successful, but may only be scratching the surface of the possible and could be expanded. Joint ventures with business could potentially deliver a degree of self-sustainment. Examples might include the leasing of office space (perhaps like the WeWork model), logistics hubs or partnering with a gym provider.

Royal Marines Barracks London is at the heart of its Wandsworth community. It delivers several youth initiatives in partnership with a local academy. Not only the home of Royal Marines Reserves City of London, it houses Army cadets, enables the St John's Ambulance cadets and is home to the Wandsworth Boxing Club youth initiative. The site remained operational during the COVID-19 pandemic, providing business continuity for other units as well as hosting a COVID-19 testing unit.

### 5.5.3 The virtual estate

The COVID-19 pandemic has modernised remote working practices, accelerating the use of technology. Reserve units have grasped these changes and found ways to continue to deliver operational effectiveness through virtual networking. Units have used these instruments to re-engage virtually with low attenders, improve the lived experience, reduce unnecessary travel and minimise time spent on administrative activities.

Virtual networks are also increasingly being used by specialist reservists. Physical basing for specialist reserves can be challenging because their small numbers of staff are often geographically dispersed. These networks are already delivering considerable benefit to the whole force by:

- creating knowledge bases and consultancy points for specialists
- enabling specialists to work collaboratively with their regular colleagues as teams in a blended workforce

Developing these models further provides a huge opportunity to draw new specialist talent into the Reinforcement Reserve that might otherwise be excluded because of geography or deterred by having to attend in person.

The MOD is already gaining benefits by siting some specialist hubs near to geographic centres of excellence. For example, Defence Innovation Initiative is creating a network of experimentation and business engagement hubs in the proximity of UK captains of industry.

Regular forces have started to engage with reserve units and specialist individuals online, accelerating knowledge sharing. This non-geographical 'virtual basing footprint' should be exploited as part of future basing plans, connecting virtual networks to the physical hubs. Savings achieved by optimising the physical number of reserve centres could be reinvested in mobile digital access points in a network across the armed forces. By 2030, we envision a network of MOD sites, some 'behind the wire' on regular bases, some within local communities in reserve centres, and all connected virtually.

### Recommendation

Consider configuring the reserves estate to create local hubs for defence outputs, including resilience support, contemporary training provision, mobilisation, and civil engagement. Collaborate more with public and private sectors, sharing use and deriving income where feasible.

## 5.6 Call-out, mobilisation and assured readiness

### 5.6.1 Background to current policy and protections

Technically, 'mobilisation' is the process of preparing individuals and units – whether regular or reserve – for deployment on a task. 'Call-out' is the legal process of compelling reservists

into permanent service, while 'recall' applies expressly to former ex-regulars with a return of service liability.<sup>116</sup>

Call-out triggers a raft of protections and compensations for both reservists and their employers. Current overarching policy is set against RFA 96, which allowed for more routine use of reservists on operations.<sup>117</sup> The Defence Reform Act 2014 developed on this, leading to the DAOTO policy which now enables reserves to be called out for virtually any purpose for which Defence might use the regular force. DAOTO continues to prove to be a powerful tool, creating ever-increasing opportunities for reservists to serve.

### 5.6.2 Policy development

This review finds that current call-out legislation is broadly fit for purpose. On policy, DAOTO should be evolved because it offers clear scope for the reserves to support IOpC sub-threshold activity. There is, however, scope to develop alternative options to call-out with suitable protections, to create more flexibility and opportunity for the reserves to deliver such outputs.

At the moment, the binary alternative is to use day-rate payment (Reserve Service Days or RSDs). This would seem a somewhat poor alternative. For example, although policy allows reservists to participate in UK resilience operations for up to 14 days without call out but on RSDs, volunteers do so at lower remuneration rates and with less protections than if mobilised.<sup>118</sup> They will not receive the full pay supplement and, while they could remain on military sick pay if injured, this may be significantly less than their primary employment (which may itself be put at risk).

Work is needed to bridge the gap between use of call-out and RSDs, exploring existing or future TACOS types and perhaps introducing some risk-based flexibility over assigning the facets of call-out (such as medical care)

<sup>116</sup> We use the term call-out in this section in the main for brevity.

<sup>117</sup> This allowed for a substantial UK reserves contribution to be made to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond.

<sup>118</sup> Or compared to regular colleagues. Defence People: Reserve Forces and Cadets, 'The Use of Reserves on UK Resilience Operations', 2019DIN03-002, February 2019.



depending on the nature of the operation or exercise. Associating the protections with the event, rather than the individual, could reduce the administrative burden while protecting reservists. For activities that require full employment protection for a significant time period, call-out will no doubt remain the best approach.

### 5.6.3 Improving mobilisation processes

The COVID-19 pandemic produced three core lessons for call-out and mobilisation. First, a lack of sufficient knowledge across Defence hampered effective and swift mobilisation.<sup>119</sup> The RAuxAF fared well initially because they maintain a mobilisation capability at unit level. Second, identifying appropriately skilled and experienced reservists proved challenging because of a lack of searchable data. Third, a significant proportion of reservists had not maintained themselves at the required standard of medical preparedness.

“I have found mobilisation to be poorly understood by almost everybody... Readiness is largely a paperwork exercise without access to all medical and dental information and a robust mobilisation process.”

**Commanding Officer,  
Army Reserve Combat Unit**

Linked to the need to build a genuine whole-force culture, there is a clear requirement to educate the force on the utility of the reserves and how to bring them into service. As this is future core business, such education should be mandated at all levels. Mobilisation itself needs to be managed at two levels. First, centrally, by subject matter experts with enough corporate knowledge and expertise to co-ordinate mobilisation of significant numbers

during major crises. Second, by trained local reserve staff with a knowledge of unit personnel, who can identify the most appropriate individuals for mobilisation. A primary role of unit commanders should be to maximise and track the readiness of their personnel for mobilisation and ensure their staff are aware of individual responsibilities to maintain readiness. An RSO and local hubs could have a role in supporting the single services to achieve more assured reserves readiness, improve force preparation and to help with the flow of information (between Defence, the reservists, their employers and families).

We have heard concerns among reservists about the effects of cancelled mobilisations. It is currently said that the MOD seems to ‘hold all the cards’, being able to cancel an individual call-out notice at any time. This can present issues for the reservist and their employer who may have arranged cover for their absence. Reversing these arrangements can be costly and result in the loss of goodwill. The balance of risk needs to be shared more equitably to avoid disenfranchisement.

Solving the above issues alone will not be sufficient to provide Defence with the level of assurance it needs to be confident the reserves can deliver a greater contingent effect. To do this, mobilisation needs to be practised. During the Cold War, the MOD regularly rehearsed reserve mobilisation at scale. While the UK has minimised such exercises, other nations have continued. In preparing for Exercise Vostok in 2018, Russia mobilised 21 reserve units and recalled thousands of citizen reservists for 16 special exercises.<sup>120</sup> The UK's Agile Stance campaign has begun re-investigating and testing aspects of readiness and reserve mobilisation. This work should not only include the Operational Reserve, but also the Strategic Reserve, parts of which must be periodically exercised – and incentivised to do so – if it is to provide a credible deterrent.

<sup>119</sup> Lack of sufficient knowledge is endemic, as evidenced by the Army Personnel Centre and the Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre Basingstoke. Staff arguably rotate in and out of post too frequently to acquire a sufficient level of knowledge, units lack focus or preparedness, and individuals must take some responsibility for their own readiness and destiny.

<sup>120</sup> NATO, ‘VOSTOK 2018: 10 years of Russian strategic exercises and warfare preparation’, 20 December 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/12/20/vostok-2018-ten-years-of-russian-strategic-exercises-and-warfare-preparation/index.html>.

Modern data analytics can be used to improve the levels of confidence in reserve readiness further. In this regard, mobilisation and the ability to demonstrate its effectiveness is part of the UK's deterrence and can be used as a visible signal that the government is escalating its preparedness for war.

#### **5.6.4 Data analytics to drive assured readiness**

Modern, sophisticated data analytics offer Defence the potential to unlock genuinely assured readiness for both force elements and individuals. This technology will provide a degree of insight that offers scope to promote whole-force confidence in the preparedness and utility of the reserve forces. Current initiatives to cohere, develop and exploit the necessary technology are heading in the right direction,<sup>121</sup> to which there are significant merits in adding an associated pan-reserves analytics project.

#### **5.6.5 Metrics to inform data-driven assured individual readiness**

Current metrics for reserves' readiness are assessed on an annual basis. They include attendance, basic training tests and role qualifications. While useful, these metrics are rudimentary and easily misinterpreted. The 'one size fits all' approach to qualifying criteria may be appropriate for a generalist reservist, but it does not reflect the efficiency of specialists. Similarly, the Certificate of Efficiency (COE) does not reveal those who have just fallen short of the qualifying criteria and why.

More work is required to identify and exploit the right metrics through which to measure true individual reservist readiness in future. As well as individual training, metrics should include validated specialist skills, level of collective competency, medical fitness and personal availability.

### **5.6.6 Methods to incentivise readiness**

#### **Training bounty**

The format and qualifying criteria of the current training bounty was introduced by the 1978 Shapland Report, which described it as 'a traditional element of the financial reward for Volunteer Service'.<sup>122</sup> The training bounty has become part of the reserves' DNA, despite its value decreasing by about 50%, relative to daily pay. There is an opportunity to modernise the training bounty to enable it to have a more material impact on readiness. Technology and analytics should allow us to link the bounty to a more nuanced set of COE metrics, tailored to individual roles.

For instance, the Operational Reserve criteria might be largely based on traditional readiness factors, whereas for specialists or individuals in the Reinforcement Reserve, the criteria might be more focused on competence and utility. A specialist's bounty attainment might be more appropriately geared to continuous professional development. The concept could be further developed to enable finer refinement of qualification criteria. This could be by way of an annual agreement based on negotiation between the employee and manager and linked to annual performance objectives. This, perhaps enabled by personal digital technology (such as MyNavy), could make setting and achieving COE more engaging, participative and effective.

There are currently nuances between the single services over measuring individual value. Consideration should be given to replacing the current Year 1, 2, 3/4 and 5 payments with Level 1, 2, 3 and 4, allowing single services to develop their own policies on qualification criteria for each level. Lateral entrants' training bounty could be accelerated to reflect the value of their knowledge and skill. Finally, consideration could be given to extending a level of bounty to those in a revitalised Strategic Reserve who maintain their own prescribed

<sup>121</sup> The Joint 'R2-D2' initiative – as developed – and single-service applications such as the Army's MUSTER project will provide truthful insight into readiness levels across the forces by pulling data from a wide variety of sources. Companion apps, such as 'myMUSTER' will enable individuals to read and write data, promoting personal engagement over readiness.

<sup>122</sup> The report noted that, for impact, the bounty needed to be 'substantial' and the qualifying system 'simple'. MOD, 'Report of the Committee on Study of Waste in the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve', 1978.

level of personal readiness (medical, refresher training etc).

### Reserves x-factor

The reserves receive a variety of levels of x-factor. Only FTRS (Full Commitment) and mobilised reservists receive the same 14.5% level as regulars. Most reservists receive 5% while FTRS (Home Commitment) receive 0%. There are 13 elements to x-factor. Given the evolving expectations on reservists, the relative applicability of the elements of x-factor between reserves and regulars should be reviewed to ensure fairness.

#### Recommendation

Develop data analytics to measure reserves readiness in detail, driving whole force confidence in an assured resource. Configure incentives to promote personal readiness and competence for role.

### 5.6.7 Medical considerations for readiness and mobilisation

While occupational health of reservists is the responsibility of the Defence Medical Services (DMS), primary and secondary health care are largely the responsibility of the individual reservist under NHS or private arrangements.<sup>123</sup> DMS is not currently resourced to provide these services routinely to reservists and its geographical footprint is matched to support the regular, rather than the reservist.

Vaccinations are a particular issue because Defence requires a higher level of routine immunisation than the NHS will routinely fund and provide.<sup>124</sup> While Defence provides all necessary vaccinations for reservists once

mobilised, this can slow down the mobilisation process.<sup>125</sup> With call-out for DAOTO being allowed, and increases in activity for reservists proposed within this review, there is a need to reassess where Defence should be paying for a reservist's immunisation costs.

There is also an enduring issue over the visibility of a reservist's medical records. Unlike Norway, for instance, where all servicepeople are managed by the same healthcare and record system as civilian citizens, DMS does not currently have visibility of a reservist's NHS records without the individual's authorisation. The drawbacks of this were shown during mobilisation for Operation Rescript (the COVID-19 pandemic) when 43% of reservists required additional medical preparation. This ranged from insufficient vaccinations to more serious underlying conditions. Personnel are required to provide information but DMS relies on reservists being aware of this requirement (a command responsibility) and being transparent (an individual responsibility). There have been cases of personnel failing to report injuries and illness, including mental health issues, that should have precluded military activity.

While reservists are required under policy to declare any GP visits, our surveys indicated that many are unaware of this requirement. As the current DMS medical information system is not able to access a reservist's NHS records, integrated electronic healthcare records are often incomplete, and some reservists may be medically unfit for years without Defence being aware. Interviews with DMS staff revealed that 350 Army reservists do not have a Joint Medical Employment Standard and some blood type records are incomplete.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>123</sup> Policy is laid out separately by the services. Maritime is given in BRd 3(2), Chapter 3, annex 3B, paragraph 2b. Army is given in Reserve Land Forces Regs, annex E, Chapter 3, paragraph 4. RAF is given in AP3392, volume 7, part 2, Chapter 28, paragraph 19.

<sup>124</sup> Defence provides diphtheria, tetanus and polio boosters at 10 years. It also recommends personnel are offered measles, mumps and rubella (MMR – this was required for Operation RESCRIPT). Not all reservists will have been offered this before age 18. It is these items that personnel lack on mobilisation (JSP 950 Lft 7-1-1 annex B).

<sup>125</sup> As set out in JSP950 Lft 7-1-1, annex A.

<sup>126</sup> Several cohorts were affected. For longer-serving personnel the issue arose from disposal of hard copy medical notes which were not all summarised and scanned into electronic records. For newer personnel, the processes for moving medical info collected on entry and the creation of an electronic record need to be streamlined. Army Order 20/310 has encouraged units to help address this and the number of personnel without Joint Medical Employment Standard is falling.

Programme Cortisone should provide connectivity with the NHS via a new medical information ecosystem, although reservists will have to give their consent to give the DMS visibility of their NHS records. As part of the programme, DMS should consider developing a system for the NHS to proactively alert them of any medical or mental issues that might impact on a reservist's fitness for mobilisation.

Pending the outcomes of Programme Cortisone, all reservists should be required and reminded to make a formal annual declaration of any medical and mental health visits to GPs and the NHS, confirm an annual dental check has been completed, and that their vaccinations are up to date.<sup>127</sup> This should ideally become a requirement of the annual certificate of efficiency. It could be enabled digitally for ease of use and to encourage participation. It must also be a clear unit command responsibility to ensure these declarations are made, especially within the Operational Reserve.

There is merit to considering age-related medical assessments across the reserves, similar to the system already employed within the Maritime Reserve.

Defence could do more to encourage reservists to remain medically fit. While slightly discounted private medical insurance is currently offered to all personnel through a private healthcare intermediary, it could be a powerful incentive if MOD were to formally negotiate a group medical insurance policy for its employees with a private healthcare provider, using the potential significant pool of 'fit' personnel to spread the risk and generate significant discounts. This could be an offer to the whole force but would be especially relevant to and beneficial for reservists. Paid for by the individual (as it is in the US with military TRICARE health plans), this would act as a recruitment and retention incentive while helping guarantee the availability of reservists for mobilisation. The private health provider's network could also be leveraged to provide discounted vaccinations in the absence of MOD provision.

### Recommendation

Refine mobilisation policy and procedures to maximise reservist opportunities for active tasks and be better prepared to mobilise for contingent tasks. Specifically review processes to improve reservists' medical and dental readiness for tasks.

<sup>127</sup> The declaration would affirm whether a reservist has a condition from a list derived from the Manual of Medical Fitness (JSP950 Lft 6-7-7). It would ideally flag any due Defence audiometry assessments or Joint Medical Employment Standard reviews.



# Engagement log

The following table lists engagements conducted by members of the review team, noting those where the Chair was present. The list is intended to illustrate the breadth of consultation and is not exhaustive.

## Abbreviations:

1SL	First Sea Lord	MD	Managing Director
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff	MilCap	Military Capability
ACDS	Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff	MinAF	Minister for the Armed Forces
AH	Assistant Head (OF5-level officer)	MPLT	Military People Leadership Team
Asst	Assistant	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff	OC	Officer Commanding
CDP	Chief of Defence Personnel	Pers	Personnel
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff	Prof	Professor
CEO	Chief Executive Officer	PUS	Permanent Under Secretary
CG	Commandant General	RFCA	Reserves Forces' and Cadets' Association
CGS	Chief of the General Staff	RUSI	Royal United Service Institute
Comd	Commander	SJC	Standing Joint Commander
COMEC	Council of Military Education Committees	SofS	Secretary of State for Defence
COS	Chief of Staff	TESRR	Training, Education, Skills, Recruitment and Resettlement
DACOS	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff	UAS	University Air Squadron
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff	UOTC	University Officer Training Corps
DFID	Department for International Development	VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
DPLT	Defence People Leadership Team	VP	Vice President
DSCOM	Defence Supply Chain Operations & Movements		
FP	Force Protection		
Hd	Head (OF6-level officer)		
KCL	King's College London		

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
17/03/20	MOD: CDS	CDS; Chair RF30	RF30 vision and direction of travel
17/03/20	MOD: Defence Relationship Management	Deputy Director, Assistant Director, COS	
18/03/20	MOD: Directorship of Sponsorship and Organisation Policy	Joe Dean	
18/03/20	MOD: People Concepts & Development	Michael Little	Enterprise Approach
31/03/20	Army Recruiting and Initial Training Command (ARITC)	AH Reserves Operations	Recruiting plans and future initial training
23/03/20	Army: Reserves Strategy Team (RST)	Hd Reserves Strategy and others	Plus weekly thereafter; Chair RF30 attended regularly
23/03/20	Army: Project EMBANKMENT	Hd EMBANKMENT and others	Future Army structures. Plus subsequent meetings
24/03/20	MOD: VCDS	VCDS; Chair RF30	Seek support for RF30 vision and direction of travel
26/03/20	MOD: MilCap	DCDS (MilCap); Chair RF30	Capability trends that impact RF30
26/03/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
27/03/20	MOD: Commercial	Chief Commercial Officer; Chair RF30	Government Commercial function, Enterprise Approach and skills sharing across government
27/03/20	MOD: People Transformation	Director of Transformation; Chair RF30	People transformation
31/03/20	Army: Initial Training Group (ITG)	Comd ITG	Future initial training, technology
31/03/20	Airbus	VP Corporate Affairs; Defence Business Development Director; Chair RF30	Whole force, Enterprise Approach, integration through reserves
1/04/20	RUSI	Elizabeth Braw; Chair RF30	Modern deterrence
1/04/20	MOD: Chief Operating Officer	Chief Operating Officer; Director General Commercial, Defence Equipment & Support; Chair RF30	Enabling transformation
2/04/20	Serco	Strategic Development Director; Chair RF30	Whole force and integration, Gold Alumni Association, skills, Sponsored Reserves

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
02/04/20	MOD: Economic Security Policy	Director Economic Security and Prosperity; Chair RF30	Links into Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and private sector
03/04/20	Army: Land Warfare Centre	Asst Comd, AH Reserves	Phase 2/3 training, Agile Stance campaign. Several subsequent meetings
03/04/20	MOD: PUS	MOD Permanent Secretary; Chair RF30	Seek support for RF30 vision and direction of travel
03/04/20	RAuxAF 601 Squadron	OC 601 Squadron	Engagement with 601 Squadron Honorary Gp Cpts (industry SMEs)
06/04/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
08/04/20	RUSI	Elizabeth Braw; Chair RF30	People Strategy
15/04/20	MOD: Defence Innovation	Director Defence Innovation; Chair RF30	Engagement with the private sector through innovation
17/04/20	Army: Directorate Reserves	Director Reserves and others	Twice monthly coherence checks thereafter
17/04/20	MOD: Enterprise Approach	Mubashshir Hussain	
18/04/20	Army: Reserves General Staff conference	Director Reserves, Deputy Commander Field Army and others; Chair RF30	Regular cross-briefings for senior Army Reservists
20/04/20	RAuxAF Inspectorate	Inspector RAuxAF	RAuxAF view of issues
21/04/20	Army: Programme CASTLE	SO1 Reserves	First of multiple engagements with CASTLE staff
22/04/20	MOD: CDS	CDS; VCDS; Chair RF30	Progress update, whole force and legislative change
22/04/20	RE:ACT	CEO RE:ACT	Formally Team Rubicon UK. Resilience through the charity sector
22/04/20	HQ Air	SO1 Reserve Support	Discussion on RAF use of FTRS
27/04/20	South East RFCA	Chief Executive	
28/04/20	Army: Information Exploitation (IX)	Various	Digital enablement. First of several engagements across IX
29/04/20	Defence Academy	Hd Learning	First of several engagements
29/04/20	RFCA External Scrutiny Team	Maj Gen (retd) Simon Lator; Maj Gen (retd) Jamie Gordon; Chair RF30	
29/04/20	BT Military Engagement	BT Head of Military Engagement	Whole force, integration through reserves

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
01/05/20	MOD: Defence People	CDP; ACDS (Reserves & Cadets); Director of Transformation; Hd People Strategy; Chair RF30	Integration with the People Strategy
05/05/20	Army: Land Warfare Centre	Director Land Warfare and others; Chair RF30	
06/05/20	Serco	Strategic Partnership Director; Strategic Development Director	Whole force, integration, sharing of workforce skills
06/05/20	MOD Standing Joint Command (UK)	Commander SJC (UK); Chair RF30	Resilience, Op RESCRIPT (military response to COVID-19)
07/05/20	Universal Defence and Security Solutions	Gen (Retd) Sir Richard Barrons; Chair RF30	Resilience and homeland defence, Global Britain
07/05/20	KBR	MD KBR FTX	Sponsored Reserves
07/05/20	HQ Air	SO1 Astra People	Discuss RAF's Prog Astra implications for RF30
08/05/20	RE:ACT	Chairman RE:ACT (Gen (Retd) Sir Nick Parker); Chair RF30	Resilience and homeland defence, charity sector contribution to resilience
11/05/20	MOD	Senior British Loan Services Officer, Oman; Chair RF30	Loan service, overseas defence engagement
12/05/20	Linkedin	Antony Whetham (Account Director)	First of several engagements with Linkedin
13/05/20	Office for Veterans' Affairs	Director, Office for Veterans' Affairs	Incentivising veterans to join the reserves
13/05/20	MOD: Security Policy and Operations	Hd Defence Commitments and Crises	Resilience and homeland defence. Engagement with other government departments
13/05/20	DHL	Jim Hart; Lindsey Bridges	Use of reservists, workforce management
14/05/20	MOD: public sector	Military Secretary and General Officer, Scotland; Commander 51 Brigade; Brig Charles Coull; Chair RF30	Scottish Resilience model. Resilience and homeland defence
14/05/20	Deloitte	Chris Recchia; Chair RF30	Utility of reservists in the private sector, skills sharing
14/05/20	X-Forces Enterprise	CEO, X-Forces	Sharing skills with the private sector
14/05/20	Army: Home Command	Asst Commander and others	Inflow, COVID response. First of several engagements
14/05/20	Reserves estate and basing	Various	First of several engagements on basing with stakeholders



Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
15/05/20	EDF Energy	Head of Community Relations, Hinkley Point C; Chair RF30	Resilience, sponsored reserves
15/05/20	PwC	Partner Affairs Director – Career Transition Support	Skills sharing with the private sector
18/05/20	RAF Peer Review Group	CG RAuxAF; AVM (ret'd) Nigel Bairsto; Inspector RAuxAF; Wg Cdr David Caddick; SO1 Astra People	RAF peer review
19/05/20	MOD: Defence Engagement	ACDS (Defence Engagement); Chair RF30	Persistent engagement overseas, transfer of skills and expertise, Global Britain
19/05/20	MOD: Defence People	Hd, People Concepts & Development	Enterprise Approach
19/05/20	MOD: Training, Education, Skills, Recruitment and Resettlement	Hd TESRR; SO1 Recruitment Policy	TESRR view on RF30, recruit and retain themes
20/05/20	MOD: CDS	CDS; VCDS; Chair RF30	Auxiliary force, contingent capability, military commitment types, blended workforce, legislation, headcount targets
22/05/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
26/05/20	HQ Air	COS Pers Reserves SO1	First of several engagements on training
27/05/20	CybSafe	CEO CybSafe	Sharing of skills with the private sector
28/05/20	Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre	AH Concepts and others	IOpC25 detail and coherence
29/05/20	Navy Command	SO1 Maritime Reserves	First of several engagements on training
30/05/20	KBR	Hd KBR Armed Forces Network	Sponsored Reserves
30/05/20	QinetiQ	Strategic Engagement Director	Sponsored Reserves
01/06/20	Unit Based Virtual Training Future synthetic training	Neville MacMillan	
01/06/20	Border Force	Director General, Border Force; Chair RF30	Sharing reservists across public sector, seasonal workforces

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
01/06/20	Department for International Development	Civil-Military Advisor, DFID	Sharing reservists across public sector
02/06/20	Army: Directorate of Capability	SO1 Training Capability Strategy	Future collective and synthetic training. First of several engagements
02/06/20	MOD: National Security Policy	Director, National Security, MOD; Chair RF30	Resilience/critical national infrastructure vulnerabilities, across-departmental sharing of skills, Sponsored Reserves
02/06/20	MOD: MinAF	MinAF, Chair RF30	RF30 update and direction of travel
02/06/20	MOD Deputy Director Special Forces	Name withheld, Chair RF30	Demand signal for reservists
04/06/20	RAuxAF Inspectorate	CG RAuxAF; Inspector RAuxAF	RAuxAF co-ordination
04/06/20	HQ Air Command	SO1 Employment Policy	Discussion of RAFR TACOS
05/06/20	Home Office	Col James Forrest	In his capacity as Deputy Reserve Champion for the Reserves at the Home Office
05/06/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
06/06/20	Army: Directorate of Engagement and Communication.	Director Engagement and Communication and others	Brand and strategic comms, overseas engagement
08/06/20	MOD: Intelligence Transformation Sharing of skills through reservists, partnerships with private sector	Director Strategy and Enterprise Services	
08/06/20	HQ Air Command	COS Reserves; ACOS Workforce Requirements and Recruiting; ACOS Policy; ACOS Career Management; Inspector RAuxAF	Discussion of RAFR workforce implications for RF30
09/06/20	Military People Leadership Team 2* Board	MPLT members; Chair RF30	Part of the formal governance of RF30
10/06/20	HQ Air Command	DACOS Space	Use of specialist reservists in space domain
10/06/20	RAF Recruitment & Selection	OC Aptitude, Recruitment & Selection	Discussion on role of UAS
11/06/20	Army: Aviation Centre	Commanding Officer and others	One of several engagements with training providers

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
11/06/20	MOD: Defence People	AH Talent	Discussion on lateral entry
11/06/20	UK Strategic Command: Defence Digital Services	Hd Defence Digital Services and others	Future digital. First of several engagements
11/06/20	MOD: Europe/Canada desk	Elizabeth McCulloch	Scandinavian Total Defence
12/06/20	MOD: Euro Atlantic Policy	Director International Security Policy; Chair RF30	Global Britain and utility of reserves overseas. Total Defence models
12/06/20	UK Strategic Command	Director Military Digitisation; Chair RF30	Future digital
12/06/20	MOD: Defence Innovation Roundtable	AH Defence Innovation; Portfolio AH; Deputy Hd Engagement; AH Engagement	Defence/private sector partnership through innovation
12/06/20	Armed Forces Recruitment Programme	SO1 Programme Manager	Future recruitment initiatives
14/06/20	Integration with private sector	Lt Gen (retd) Sir Paul Newton; Chair RF30	Whole force, integration with the private sector; sponsored reserves
15/06/20	Armed Forces Recruitment Programme	SO1 Programme Manager; SO3 ROM; Nafeesah Saraf, Deloitte contractor	Future recruitment initiatives
15/06/20, 16/06/20	MOD: UK Special Forces	Name withheld; Chair RF30	Demand versus flexibility/agility, TACOS, delegations, liability
16/06/20	MOD: Defence People	AH Talent; Jo McArdle	Discussion on lateral entry
16/06/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
17/06/20	MOD: Military Strategic Operations	DCDS (Military Strategic Operations); Chair RF30	Access to skills, contingent capability, alchemy of regular/reserve mix, assured capability
17/06/20	MOD: Director General Finance	Director General Finance; AH Spending Policy, Chair RF30	Incentivising greater use of reserves, charging mechanisms with other government departments
17/06/20	Cambridge University Officers Training Corps	Commanding Officer	Use of university service units as hubs for innovation
18/06/20	RAF Peer Review Group	Gp Capt Martin Routledge; Wg Cdr Paul Baroni; Wg Cdr David Caddick	Peer review of RF30 initial findings
19/06/20	Defence Medical Services	SO2 Reserve Operational Health	Medical aspects of mobilisation

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
20/06/20	Army: Reserves General Staff conference	Director Reserves, Deputy Commander Field Army and others; Chair RF30	Regular cross-briefings for senior Army Reservists
22/06/20	HQ Air Command	COS Reserves; ACOS Workforce Requirements and Recruiting; ACOS Policy; ACOS Career Management; Inspector RAuxAF; DACOS Reserves; DACOS Workforce, Intelligence & Fusion; Chair RF30	HQ Air engagement
23/06/20	Defence People Leadership Team 3* Board		Part of the formal governance of RF30
23/06/20	MOD: Military Capability	DCDS (MilCap), Chair RF30	
23/06/20	MOD: Defence Intelligence	Chief of Defence Intelligence; Director Strategy and Enterprise Services, Chair RF30	Developing and sharing specialist skills with the private sector and with agencies
23/06/20	MOD: Cyber and Space Policy	Hd, Cyber and Space Policy	Accessing specialist skills through reserves
23/06/20	MOD Special Operations	Name withheld	Accessing specialist skills through reserves
23/06/20	Council of Military Education Committees (COMEC)	Chair COMEC	University innovation
24/06/20	Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications HQ	Names withheld; Chair RF30	Pooling of niche/scare skills, sharing of defence expertise for exercises and operations through reservists
24/06/20	MOD: Strategy and International	Director General Strategy and International; Chair RF30	Global Britain and defence engagement
24/06/20	Foreign & Commonwealth Office	Director Defence and International Security; Communications Manager Science and Innovation Network; Chair RF30	Using reserves to enhance Global Britain through persistent engagement, exporting skills and expertise
24/06/20	Army: Directorate of Personnel	Assistant Commander and others	With regular coherence checks thereafter



Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
25/06/20	Defence Academy	STEM Graduate Inflow Scheme Project Manager	University bursaries and sponsorship
26/06/20	MOD: CDS	CDS, VCDS, Chair RF30	Link to IOpC, Reserve Support Organisation, workforce freedom, DSIS
26/06/20	Royal Military Academy Sandhurst	Commander University Officers Training Corps	Use of university units as recruitment and innovation hubs
29/06/20	Babcock International	MD Land Defence; Senior Advisor (Defence and International); Ben Ryan	Whole-force integration, sponsored reserves
29/06/20	6 Flying Training School (FTS)	Commandant 6 FTS; COS Development, 6 FTS; Training Officer	Discussion on UAS policy and roles
30/06/20	Chiefs of Staff Committee	CDS, VCDS, 1SL, CGS, CAS	
01/07/20	NATO	Chairman, NATO Military Committee, Chair RF30	Discussion on Total Defence and resilience
01/07/20	MOD: Joint Force Development	Director General Joint Force Development; Chair RF30	
01/07/20	Land Warfare Centre	AH Reserves	Discussion of mobilisation exercise (military judgement panel)
01/07/20	591 Support Unit	OC 591 Support Unit Reserves	Nature and character of 591 SU hybridity
02/07/20	MOD Director, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy	Director Defence and Security Industrial Strategy	Private sector engagement, skills sharing, incentivisation, Global Britain
02/07/20	US National Guard	Col Kevin Crawford, Maj Thomas Baker	US Approach to regulars, reserves and the National Guard
02/07/20	Oxford Brookes University	Prof Vince Connelly	Historical aspects and context of mobilisation of regular reserve
03/07/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
07/07/20	MOD: Integrated Review	Hd Defence Strategy; Chair RF30	Update on Integrated Review and RF30, coherence check
07/07/20	HQ Air Command	SO1 Reserve Capability	RAuxAF mobilisation
08/07/20	MOD: VCDS	VCDS; Chair RF30	Reserve Support Organisation
08/07/20	MOD: Chief Information Officer	Director Military Digitisation; Chair RF30	Digital transformation, accessing skills through reservists
08/07/20	24 (Commando) Regiment Royal Engineers	Commanding Officer	Hybrid models in practice

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
09/07/20	MOD: Loan Service	Hd Global Loan Service Review	Loan service review
13/07/20	Defence Academy	Dr Christina Goulter, KCL; Dr David Jordan, KCL	Academic perspective on RF30 emerging ideas
13/07/20	HQ Air Command	DACOS Reserves; SO1 Reserve Capability; SO1 Reserve Support; SO1 Reserve Projects; SO2 Reserve Engagement; SO2 Reserve Capability Development; WO Reserve Capability	RAF Reserves Personnel Management Centre engagement
14/07/20	Challenge Board	Elisabeth Braw (RUSI); Air Cdre (ret'd) Paul O'Neill (RUSI) Alastair Cooper (Industry rep and reservist); Paul Lincoln (Director General, Border Force); Kris Murrin (CEO National Leadership Centre); Jeremy Greaves (VP Corporate Affairs and Strategy, Airbus, and ex-reservist); Chair RF30	A diverse team of public and private sector experts provided initial advice and feedback on RF30's planned delivery, recommendations and tone.
15/07/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
16/07/20	Open forum webinar	Over 200 serving reservists and regulars, veterans, MOD staff and other external guests received a briefing about RF30 plans and offered opinions and views	Webinar
17/07/20	622 Squadron RAuxAF	OC 622 Squadron	RAuxAF aircrew challenges
18/07/20	Army: Reserve Corps Colonels	Asst Comd Home Command and others	Forum for heads of arms from a reserves perspective
20/07/20	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	Rt Hon Michael Gove MP; Chair RF30	Resilience
22/07/20	UK Strategic Command webinar	Nine high-level budget reps and others; RF30 Chair	RF30 progress discussion
23/07/20	MOD: Space	SO1 Space and Cyber, Air Staff	Reservist space subject experts

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
23/07/20	Defence Medical Services	Director Medical Personnel and Training	Medical aspects of mobilisation; Sponsored Reserves; blended military/NHS roles; unified career models
23/07/20	Army: Homeland and Resilience forum	Various	Discussion and coordination of resilience work strands in the light of the pandemic
24/07/20	Babcock	MD Land Defence; Senior Advisor (Defence and International); Ben Ryan	Whole-force integration, sponsored reserves
24/07/20	HQ Air Command	SO1 Reserve Support	RAuxAF Lateral Entry policy
28/07/20	Norwegian reserve	Secretary General Norwegian Reserve Officers Association	Brief on approach for the reserves
28/07/20	Cabinet Office	Assistant Director Cabinet Office, Hd Defence Strategy	Resilience
29/07/20	UK Strategic Command: Joint Training and Simulation	Deputy Hd Joint Training and Simulation	Future synthetic training. Part of a series of such engagements.
30/07/20	MOD: Training, Education, Skills, Recruitment and Resettlement	SO2 Skills Policy	Reserve apprenticeship examination
30/07/20	MOD: Lateral Entry Working Group	Various	
03/08/20	RAF Recruitment and Selection	Gp Capt Recruit and Select; SO1 Ops	RAF recruiting initiatives
06/08/20	RAF Reserves	COS Reserves; Inspector RAuxAF	RAFR Optimisation
07/08/20	Commanding Officers' survey	Various	Qualitative questionnaire to a representative group of Cos of reserves or hybrid units, tri-Service
12/08/20	RAF Force Protection HQ	Gp Capt FP; OC 3 FP Wing HQ; SO1 FP Plans; OC Tactical Police Squadron HQ; SO2 RAF Police Branch & Trade Advisor	RAF Force Protection hybrid policy
12/08/20	RAF Recruitment and Selection	Gp Capt Recruit & Select; SO1 Plans; SO1 Ops; SO1 Transformation	RAF recruiting initiatives

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
13/08/20	MOD: Training, Education, Skills, Recruitment and Resettlement	SO1 Skills Strategy; SO2 Skills Policy	MOD apprenticeship policy and possibilities
15/08/20	Military People Leadership Team 2* Board	MPLT members; Chair RF30	Part of the formal governance of RF30
18/08/20	Foreland Shipping Ltd	MD	
18/08/20	Australian Defence Force	Maj Gen Natasha Fox; Hd People Capability; Chair RF30	Australian Total Workforce System
19/08/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
19/08/20	Wessex RFCA	Chief Executive	
24/08/20	MOD: Defence Supply Chain Operations & Movements	DSCOM Contractor on Deployed Operations Mounting Cell Manager	Sponsored Reserves
25/08/20	MOD: Sea Mounting Centre	SO1 Sea Mounting Centre	Sponsored Reserves, Marchwood Military Port
25/08/20	RAF Reserves	COS Reserves	RF30 coherence
25/08/20	RUSI conference: Swedish Total Defence	Elisabeth Braw, Senior Associate Fellow and others	Presentations and discussion
26/08/20	Early Careers Forum	40 reservists under 30 years old and line managers	Webinar call
28/08/20	Defence Medical Services	SO2 Reserve Operational Health	Medical aspects of mobilisation
03/09/20	Royal Fleet Auxiliary	Commodore Royal Fleet Auxiliary	RFA view of Sponsored Reserves
03/09/20	Ex-Regular Reserves Forum	105 ex-regular reserves and veterans.	Webinar
04/09/20	Army: HQ Infantry	Commandant Infantry	
04/09/20	Navy Command HQ	Director Personnel and Training; DACOS Branch Management	Sponsored Reserves and shared employment models
07/09/20	MOD: Defence People Working Group	Various	RF30 'deep dive'
08/09/20	MOD: Talent pools and SERVE	Various	One of a series of engagements
11/09/20	RAF Reserves	Inspector RAuxAF	Coherence meeting
14/09/20	Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone	Hd Solent MEZ	Shared employment models



Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
15/09/20	Military People Leadership Team 2* Board		Part of the formal governance of RF30
18/09/20	RAF Reserves	Gp Capt Martin Routledge	Coherence meeting
22/09/20	Challenge Board	Elisabeth Braw (RUSI); Air Cdre (retd) Paul O'Neill (RUSI); AVM (retd) Nigel Bairsto (RAF); Alastair Cooper (Industry rep and reservist); Paul Lincoln (Director General, Border Force); Kris Murrin (CEO National Leadership Centre); Jeremy Greaves (VP Corporate Affairs and Strategy, Airbus, and ex-reservist); Chair RF30	
22/09/20	MOD: Defence Learning and Management Capability	Change workshop	
23/09/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
23/09/20	HQ Air Command	COS Reserves; ACOS Policy; ACOS Career Management; DACOS Workforce Requirements; Gp Capt Martin Routledge; Mr Ian Gibson; Chair RF30	RF30 coherence check
25/09/20	RAF Recruitment and Selection	SO2 Reserves, Recruitment and Selection	RAF Reserves recruitment
29/09/20	Defence People Leadership Team 3* Board		Part of the formal governance of RF30
29/09/20	Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone (MEZ)	Hd Solent MEZ and team	Shared employment and multi-employer apprenticeships
06/10/20	HQ Air Command	SO1 Reserve Support	
07/10/20	MOD: Defence People	Lateral Entry Working Group	
13/10/20	Chiefs of Staff Committee	CDS, VCDS, 1SL, CGS, CAS	
21/10/20	MOD: Agile Stance campaign	Various: reserves coherence	Ongoing series of forums

Date	Organisation/subject	Attendance	Remarks
21/10/20	Defence Equipment & Support: Defence Modelling and Simulation Coherence	Simulation Technical Authority	Future synthetic training
23/10/20	Defence Academy: Defence Simulation Centre	Manager	Future synthetic training
23/10/20	Navy Command	Commander Maritime Reserves	RF30 coherence check
26/10/20	Barclays	Veterans' Employment Transition Support Programme Manager	
29/10/20	Amazon	Programme Manager, Global Military Affairs	
04/11/20	Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets	Various	RF30 coherence check. One of a series
19/11/20	MOD: MinAF	MinAF; Chair RF30	RF30 Report submission
25/11/20	Secretary of State for Defence	SofS; CDS; Chair RF30	RF30 Report submission
13/01/21	Armed Forces Pay Review Body	Review Body members; Chair RF30	Brief on RF30 recommendations

# Glossary

Acronym	Full name	Description
ADC	Additional Duties Commitment(s)	An ADC is a formal binding commitment, provided under RFA 96 Section 25, under which a member of the reserve forces commits, in writing, to perform specified duties for specified periods. In broad terms, personnel enter an ADC to make use of competencies they already hold for regular or reserve service, or to take advantage of longer training opportunities or courses.
AFC	Armed Forces Covenant	An enduring covenant between the people of the UK, Her Majesty's Government and all those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the Crown and their Families.
AFPRB	Armed Forces Pay Review Body	An independent body that reports annually to the government making recommendations on levels of the pay award.
ARRG	Army Reserve Reinforcement Group	<p>A series of holding categories for those not formally assigned to units. The ARRG is undergoing a review to improve its utility. The concept is of interest to the other services.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ARRG 1 allows for assignment to discrete, time-limited projects and roles.</li> <li>• ARRG 1 and 2 retain sponsor unit training liability.</li> <li>• ARRG 3 and 4 have no training liability.</li> <li>• ARRG 5 is FTRS.</li> </ul>
AS (ASCP)	Agile Stance (campaign plan)	A campaign (programme) including a strand for reserves, designed to investigate and test force readiness and mobilisation through a series of studies and exercises.
CEA	Continuity of education allowance	CEA assists regular personnel providing continuity of education for their children that would otherwise be denied due to the continued mobility of their family. It is admissible for attendance at both independent boarding and state boarding schools.
CECMM Centre	Centre of Excellence for Composites, Advanced Manufacturing and Marine	The CECMM Centre is part of Isle of Wight College. It delivers engineering training programmes using new state-of-the-art facilities and is a contributor to the Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone (SMEZ).

Acronym	Full name	Description
CEMAST	Centre of Excellence in Engineering, Manufacturing and Advanced Skills Training	CEMAST campus is part of the UK's Fareham College. It delivers all of the college's automotive, engineering and manufacturing programmes and is located at Lee-on-the-Solent. CEMAST is a contributor to the Solent Maritime Enterprise Zone (SMEZ).
COE	(Commanding Officer's) certificate of efficiency	A certificate confirming that an individual reservist has completed a set amount of training outputs and attended for a minimum set number of Reserve Service Days. Linked to award of training bounty and Volunteer Reserve Service Medal.
Cortisone	Programme Cortisone	A large, complex programme to cohere all Defence Medical Services information with NHS information systems and those of partner and supporting organisations.
CT	Collective training	Training of people and force elements together. For example, army CT level 1 focuses at troop or platoon level: CT level 2 'plus' focuses at squadron or company level, within a unit-level context.
DAOTO	Defence Activities Other Than Operations (policy)	Common shorthand for a 2019 policy permitting the use of reserves mobilisation, where appropriate, to deliver non-operational outputs, which increases the range of opportunities to serve.
DC	Defence Connect	A Defence extranet accessible through the Defence Gateway offering information and collaboration, separate from DEFNET.
DDS	Defence Digital Services	An element of UK Strategic Command subordinate to the Chief Information Officer developing co-ordinated enterprise and operational IT solutions.
DLE	Defence Learning Environment	The current resource for online learning: intranet and Internet-based (through Defence Gateway).
DLMC	Defence Learning Management Capability (programme)	A UK Strategic Command-sponsored, pan-defence digital transformation programme. It will enable Defence to analyse, deliver, design and assure user-centric training and education through modern IT.
DMS	Defence Medical Services	DMS is made up of the Navy Medical Service, Army Medical Service, the Royal Air Force Medical Service and the Joint Medical Group. The primary role is to ensure the UK armed forces are medically fit.
DRA 14	The Defence Reform Act 2014	Changes included amending RFA 96 section 56 to allow call-out of reserves, if deemed necessary or desirable, for any purpose for which regular service members may be used. It also extended the period for which reservists mobilised under a call-out order may be required to serve from 9 to 12 months.
DRF&C	Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets	MOD's central point of contact and the policy directorate for tri-service reserves matters.



Acronym	Full name	Description
DRM	Defence Relationship Management	Defence Relationship Management is a single point of contact linking employers with the Ministry of Defence and offers advice and support on employing members of the Armed Forces.
DSAT	Defence Systems Approach to Training	The process relating to training analysis, design, delivery and assurance of all training, both individual and collective, across the whole force.
Dstl	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory	Dstl is one of the principal UK government organisations dedicated to science and technology in the defence and security field. It supplies specialist services to MOD and wider government, working collaboratively with external partners in industry and academia worldwide. It is run along commercial lines.
DTUS	Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme	A university sponsorship programme for students who want to join the Royal Navy, British Army, Royal Air Force or Engineering and Science Branch of the Ministry of Defence Service as technical officers after they graduate.
EA	Enterprise Approach	The Enterprise Approach establishes collaborative relationship with the private sector to pool resources where they are most needed. The goal is to work collaboratively with industry to make skills available across organisational boundaries.
ELC	Enhanced Learning Credits	The ELC scheme helps qualifying (regular) personnel and service leavers with costs of learning: annual payments over up to three separate years or one aggregated lower tier payment. ELCs may be claimed for study towards a Level 3 or higher qualification.
ERS	Employer Recognition Scheme	The Defence Employer Recognition Scheme encourages employers to support Defence. It encompasses bronze, silver and gold awards for employer organisations that pledge, demonstrate or advocate support to Defence and the armed forces community, and align with the Armed Forces Covenant.
FiMT	Forces in Mind Trust	A charitable body founded in 2011 to enable all ex-service personnel and their families to make a successful transition after service.
FLC	Front Line Commands	The 4-star single-service commands and UK Strategic Command.
FRRP	Future Reserves Research Programme	An academic study in 2018 highlighting reserves issues, sponsored by the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets (RF&C).

Acronym	Full name	Description
FTRS	Full Time Reserve Service	<p>A formal binding commitment, provided under Reserve Forces Act 1996 Section 24, under which a member of the reserve forces commits, in writing, to a period of full-time service. FTRS provides for regulars to continue to serve beyond their normal retirement date (nominally as part of the reserve forces).</p> <p>Full Commitment: Similar duties and deployment liability as a regular with generally the same pay and allowances.</p> <p>Limited Commitment (LC): An FTRS reservist who serves at one location but can be detached or deployed for up to 35 days in any one year (with no single detachment lasting in excess of 21 days consecutively).</p> <p>Home Commitment (HC): Limited range of duties in a restricted location; compulsory detachments confined to training periods and other limited duties specified in the individual's FTRS commitment.</p>
Global Britain	Global Britain	Global Britain is a government vision for the UK's overseas presence, influence and capability.
HET	Heavy Equipment Transporter	Transporters capable of carrying main battle tanks. HETs can move tanks cost-effectively, saving wear and tear on tank tracks and roads.
HRR	High Readiness Reserve	A category of reserve created under RFA 1996 with the aim of attracting volunteers with specific skills to respond at short notice. In the Army, HRR must agree to a one-year commitment. An HRR bounty is paid.
IOPC 25	Integrated Operating Concept 2025	UK doctrine document that sets out a new approach to the utility of armed force in an era of persistent competition and a rapidly evolving character of warfare.
JMES	Joint Medical Employment Standard(s)	The standard awarded by medical staff that informs commanders and career managers of the deployability and employability of that individual.
JPA	Joint Personnel Administration	The UK armed forces human resources management system.
JPAN	Joint Personnel Administration Number	The number attributed to an employment role within JPA.

Acronym	Full name	Description
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer	Officer exercising tactical responsibility, providing the primary link between Defence and civil authorities at devolved administrations, sub-national and local levels. The network of regional liaison officers comprises: joint regional liaison officers; Royal Navy regional liaison officers; and Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (JDP 03 3rd edition) 2017.
LSA	Longer Separation Allowance	LSA is designed to support and improve retention by compensating a regular service person who experiences separation beyond that compensated for by the x-factor element of basic pay. Generally it is paid at increasing amounts over 14 levels in order to target those who experience the most separation throughout their service.
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities	Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of, the event.
MOBEX	Mobilisation Exercise	An exercise to practice the procedures for bringing force elements and people into service, prepared to conduct operations. 'Mobilisation' as a term can apply to the whole force but for the reserves can involve call out.
MODNET	MODNET	The internal MOD IT infrastructure on which operates DEFNET (Defence Intranet) at 'official sensitive' to 'secret'. A DEFNET external access project is ongoing is to be offered to industry partners and MOD disadvantaged users.
MR	Maritime Reserve	The overall term for the force comprising Royal Naval Reserves and Royal Marines Reserves, commanded from a one-star HQ.
MTMC	Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre (Bassingbourn)	The Army centre that conducts mission specific training and mobilisation process for mostly Army individuals set to join operations.
MUSTER	MUSTER	MUSTER is part of a suite of new army digital systems designed to provide a genuine common operating picture and shared situational awareness. In response to tasks generated using the companion OPUS system, MUSTER deploys data analytics, pulling on multiple other sources, to show the readiness and availability of capabilities and personnel.
NSC	National Security Council	The NSC is the main forum for collective discussion of the government's objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them. It is chaired by the Prime Minister.

Acronym	Full name	Description
PTVR	Part-time volunteer reserve(s)	Generic expression for members of the RNR, RMR, Army Reserve and RAuxAF serving on part-time TACOS. Most PTVRs are in full-time civilian employment.
R2-D2	Readiness Reporting and Deployability Discovery	A team within DDS developing a data-driven view of resource demand and supply to provide accurate, trusted understanding of Defence operational capacity.
Rescript	Operation Rescript	The Joint operation commenced in 2020 to assist UK response to the COVID-19 pandemic (with Operation Broadshare covering overseas activity).
Resilience	Resilience	The ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.
RFA 96	Reserve Forces Act (1996) As amended	Makes provision with respect to the reserve forces, including their maintenance, membership, enlistment and conditions of service, training and call-out. RFA 96 repealed and replaced the Reserve Forces Act 1980 (RFA 80).
RFCA	Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Association(s)	Thirteen publicly-funded, regional arm's-length bodies enshrined under RFA96 that provide advice and support to Defence on behalf of the UK's volunteer reserve forces and cadets, deliver support to the reserves and cadets, maintain links with the community, deliver employer engagement, and maintain and support the volunteer estate.
RSD	Reserve Service Day	The routine measure of payment for reservists when working on a day rate. Can be paid as a part day. The currency of attendance and achievement of time served for the reward of COE and bounty. Formerly known as a man training day.
SGMI	Specialist Group Military Intelligence	An Army Reserve element of 1 Military Intelligence Brigade that provides intelligence support to the Army and across Defence through the recruitment of 'deep specialists' from a wide range of thematic, human domain and technical disciplines.
SLC	Standard Learning Credits (SLC scheme)	The scheme promotes lifelong personal development via financial support for multiple, small-scale learning activities throughout a career. Since 2014, eligible reserve personnel may claim 80% of course fees up to of £175 per year.
SME	Subject matter expert or small to medium sized enterprise	Self explanatory
SQEP	Suitably qualified and experienced personnel	A term used to denote the minimum sufficient level of training and experiential competence required to discharge a given role.



Acronym	Full name	Description
SR	Sponsored reserves	Employees whose employers have an arrangement (usually a contract) with the MOD for the provision of support services and who have become special members of a reserve force (under Part 5 of RFA 96). Sponsored reserves have liabilities for training and call-out so that they can be called out to continue to support MOD on operations, using their civilian skills as service personnel.
STEM	Science, technology, engineering and mathematics	A broad term now commonly used to group together these academic disciplines. May also refer to an approach to learning that integrates them.
Strategic Base	Strategic base	Comprises military assets, industrial-capacity both national and international, civilian contractors and National Health Service hospitals.  Military assets are primarily delivered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), and include: defence support chain operations and movements, storage and distribution, mounting and recovery. Some are also delivered via single services and UK Strategic Command. For example, air and sea ports of embarkation and the Joint Air Mounting Centre.
TACOS	Terms and Conditions of Service	The regulations of a service person's employment in the Armed Forces and their entitlement to, or eligibility for, remunerative and non-remunerative benefits and compensation.
TB	Training Bounty	An annual tax-free bounty paid to volunteer reservists who achieve their Certificate of Efficiency to recognise commitment, encourage retention and reward the delivery of a prescribed level of capability to assure the reserve component of the integrated future force.
TESRR	Training, Education, Skills, Recruitment and Resettlement	One of several directorates within the Chief of Defence People organisation. TESRR consists of the following teams: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• training, recruitment, assurance and governance</li> <li>• education and skills, and resettlement</li> <li>• honours, ceremonial events and commemoration</li> </ul>
Total Defence	Total Defence	Total Defence combines the armed forces and civil society in a comprehensive whole-of-society approach to security intended to deter an attack by making a target state a very challenging prospect for an aggressor.

Acronym	Full name	Description
UAS	University Air Squadron	A Royal Air Force training establishment connected to a university or universities in a particular area.
UOTC	University Officers Training Corps	An Army training establishment connected to a university or universities in a particular area.
URNU	University Royal Naval Unit	A Royal Navy training establishment connected to a university or universities in a particular area.
USANG	US Air National Guard	The state-based military force and one of three elements within the US Army and US Air Force.
UTC Portsmouth	University Technical College Portsmouth	A college providing a specialist STEM curriculum.
VeRR	Volunteer ex-Regular Reserve	Personnel with previous regular or reserve service with experience and/or skills suitable for specific duties serving on commitments up to 90 days per annum.
VRSM	Volunteer Reserve Service Medal	A reserves-specific award for long service (one year followed by a bar in increments of 5 years).
VTOD	Voluntary training other duties	In addition to mandatory annual training obligations, RFA 96 section 27 provides for reservists to be given the opportunity to volunteer. Training carried out under section 27 is entirely separate from the minimum training obligation under section 22.
WF	Whole force	<p>First articulated by Lord Levine as the Whole Force Concept. This concept has gone through several relaunches since, first as the ‘whole force approach’ and then Whole Force by Design.</p> <p>The integrated approach is underpinned by our people – regular and reserve service personnel, MOD civil servants, contractors and other civilians. Working together, these different groups form the ‘whole force’ which delivers defence outputs. Under the whole-force approach, Defence places human capability at the heart of its decision-making and ensures that defence outputs are delivered by the right mix of capable and motivated people now and in the future, and that people are managed as a strategic resource.</p>







